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The concept ‘indistinguishable’1 
 
Simon Saunders 
 
Abstract. The concept of indistinguishable particles in quantum theory is fundamental to 
questions of ontology. All ordinary matter is made of electrons, protons, neutrons, and 
photons and they are all indistinguishable particles. Yet the concept itself has proved 
elusive, in part because of the interpretational difficulties that afflict quantum theory quite 
generally, and in part because the concept was so central to the discovery of the quantum 
itself, by Planck in 1900; it came encumbered with revolution.    
I offer a deflationary reading of the concept ‘indistinguishable’ that is identical to Gibbs’ 
concept ‘generic phase’, save that it is defined for state spaces with only finitely-many 
states of bounded volume and energy (finitely-many orthogonal states, in quantum 
mechanics). That, and that alone, makes for the difference between the quantum and 
Gibbs concepts of indistinguishability.  
This claim is heretical on several counts, but here we consider only the content of the 
claim itself, and its bearing on the early history of quantum theory rather than in relation 
to contemporary debates about particle indistinguishability and permutation symmetry. It 
powerfully illuminates that history.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
If there is any consensus as to what particle indistinguishability means, it is its formal 
expression in quantum mechanics: particles must have exactly the same mass, spin, and 
charge, and their states must be symmetrised, yielding either symmetric or antisymmetric 
wave-functions. This much was set in stone by Dirac almost a century ago. But the 
implications of this depends on what the wave-function means, and what entanglement means 
(because symmetrisation of the state usually involves entanglement), and on what a particle is 
and what kinds of representations of the permutation group are acceptable and how they 
should be motivated – and thereby, on a whole raft of interpretive questions in quantum 
mechanics and in philosophy of symmetry. To first seek common ground on all these topics 
would be a challenging task.2   
Here we take an alternative approach: to consider the concept ‘indistinguishable’ prior to 
quantum mechanics proper; to consider the concept or concepts (by whatever name) that 
were actually in play leading up to Dirac’s definitive formulation of the concept in 1926. 
Fairly directly, and uncontrovertibly, that takes us to a series of papers by Einstein on the 
quantum theory of the ideal monatomic gas, published in 1924-25 (which Dirac certainly 
studied), almost his last papers on quantum theory. It was for this gas theory, following 
Bose’s method used in a new derivation of the Planck black-body radiation formula in 1924, 
that Bose-Einstein statistics was named.  
In Einstein’s second paper on the quantum theory of gases we find a structural 
correspondence between the old statistics and the new that reduces, in the dilute limit, to that 
between Boltzmann’s statistics and the statistics defined using Gibbs’ concept ‘generic 
phase’– a concept introduced in the ultimate chapter of Gibbs’ Elementary Principles in 
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2See Saunders (2003, 2013) for an attempt along these lines. 
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Statistical Mechanics in 1902. According to the generic phase, many-particle states differing 
only by particle interchange are numerically the same. It was designed to solve the Gibbs 
paradox and the closely connected puzzle of the failure of extensivity of the entropy function, 
and applied to what Gibbs called ‘indistinguishable’ particles, particles with the same state-
independent properties. Indeed, the claim defended here is that the only distinction between 
the Gibbs and Bose-Einstein notions lies in the discretisation of the state-space by Einstein, 
following Bose, and the accompanying replacement of a volume measure (Lebesgue 
measure) on state space by a numerical count of discrete states. These were defined by 
Planck’s constant: the number of ‘elementary cells’ of volume ℎ" in the one-particle phase 
space. In the dilute limit, in which cells are sparsely occupied, the result is Gibbs’ generic 
phase.3 The identification of states related to one another by particle permutations is all that is 
needed to implement the indistinguishability concept, in the quantum case as in the classical.  
This structural correspondence can hardly be gainsaid. However, it raises a certain difficulty, 
for neither Einstein nor anybody else at the time recognised it explicitly. Neither Einstein nor 
Dirac mentioned Gibb’ concept at all, despite the evident connection with the extensivity 
puzzle (that Einstein did discuss) and the Gibbs paradox. The following year, in 1925, 
Schrödinger considered a number of definitions of the entropy that included the Bose-
Einstein entropy, and in light of the extensivity puzzle; but only to reject the new gas theory, 
and again, he made no mention of Gibbs or the generic phase. The first to do so in connection 
with quantum statistics appears to have been Paul Epstein in his entry to Volume 2 of the 
Commentary on the Scientific Writings of J. Willard Gibbs, published in 1936 by Gibbs’ alma 
mater, the University of Yale. But coming so late, it has rarely been consulted by historians 
of the earlier period, and it suffered from the presupposition common to almost every account 
of particle indistinguishability after Dirac’s, that the quantum concept cannot possibly apply 
to classical statistical mechanics because classical particles can always be distinguished by 
their trajectories.4 Yet as we shall see, it was exactly by endowing the light quantum with a 
phase space of its own, whereupon its states may change over time and so possess a 
trajectory, that Bose made his breakthrough in 1924.  
There have been many studies of the history of the Planck radiation formula. However, apart 
from Thomas Kuhn’s pioneering work, Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity 
1894-1912, most have considered it in the context of the broader history of quantum theory, 
from which vantage point it makes only an episodic appearance; and Kuhn, in a history 
terminating in 1912, did not consider the concept of indistinguishability at all. Those that 
have focused on the concept of indistinguishable particles without exception embrace the 
conventional wisdom that the quantum concept requires the absence of trajectories, or 
anything else that may keep track of individual particles; whereupon it follows that classical 
particles cannot possibly be indistinguishable. No wonder that in consequence they were 
unable to identify the quantum concept with Gibbs’.5 Abraham Pais, in Subtle is the Lord, the 
 
3 An observation that appears to have first been made by Fujita (1991).  
4 Epstein (1936a p.557). Epstein also maintained that a continuous classical evolution, for a discrete state-space, 
requires Gibbs’ specific phase (1936a p.564, 527, 1936b pp.485-91). 
5 Pesic (1991a) came close, but in a second publication affirmed that particles with trajectories cannot be 
indistinguishable in the quantum sense (Pesic 1991b p.975). Kastler (1983 p.617) mentioned the connection 
with Gibbs’ generic phase, but only in passing, and insisted that particle indistinguishability is ‘intimately 
related to their wave nature’ (ibid, p.622). Monaldi (2009) argued that Gibbs’ concept of generic phase was one 
of two roots to the indistinguishability concept in quantum theory, the other being statistical dependence; she 
does not remark on the Gibbs paradox and the lack of statistical independence already implied by it. According 
to Darrigol (1991 p.239), Gibbs was the first to introduce the indistinguishability concept, but only in the 
context of what he calls the ‘molar’ or ‘holistic’ approach to probability (essentially Gibbs’ ensemble 
interpretation of probability, where each member of the ensemble of gases is defined by its specific phase); he 
 3 
Science and the Life of Albert Einstein, is exemplary: according to Pais, Planck’s early 
derivations of the black-body formula ‘prefigured the Bose-Einstein counting’ but ‘cannot be 
justified by any stretch of the classical imagination’. In contrast, the distinguishability of 
particles by their initial conditions and the continuity of their motion is ‘Boltzmann’s first 
axiom of classical mechanics’.6 Alexander Bach’s more recent monograph Classical 
Indistinguishable Particles begins with the statement that the only intelligible classical 
concept of indistinguishability concerns the invariance of probability distributions that are 
blind to the motions of individual particles; for ‘suppose they have trajectories, then the 
particles can be identified by them and are, therefore, not indistinguishable’, a statement he 
proceeded to formalise mathematically and evidently took to be definitively proven.7  
There is a related and widely-held view in the literature which connects even more directly 
with the ordinary meaning of the term: it is not only that indistinguishable quantum particles 
cannot have trajectories, it is that they cannot have states of their own at all – or if they do, 
those states must be the same. It was a short step to conclude that indistinguishable particles 
could not have precise positions and momenta.8 There was moreover a clear link between this 
and the idea of energy elements or energy-units in the writings of Boltzmann, Planck, and 
Natanson. These entities had no positions or momenta by which they could differ, let alone 
trajectories or variations in energy; it seemed the only change they could undergo was 
emission and absorption (or ‘containment’) by other entities. Natanson has often been 
accredited, by historians, as the first to articulate the indistinguishability concept,9 and on this 
point he was quite explicit: for something to count as indistinguishable in his sense, it must 
be impossible to ‘lay hold’ of it, or to ‘trace it through its course’. It was not the Gibbs’ 
concept, and nor was it the quantum concept.  
Limitations in identifying entities at one time lead to inaccessibility of identity over time, the 
two go together. But these concepts of indistinguishability are all wide of the mark. The blue 
photon is perceptually distinguishable from the red photon and the two are heading in 
different directions in space, and may change in direction and frequency over time, and hence 
in momentum; photons may well have approximate trajectories. Yet their states are 
symmetrised, and they satisfy Bose-Einstein statistics. Their classical particle limit is a gas 
defined by Gibbs’ generic phase: states related by particle interchange are identically the 
same. Indeed, it is they, the many-particle states related by permutations, that are 
indistinguishable in the epistemic sense, rather than the particles. Gibbs first used the word 
‘undistinguishable’ with reference to many-particle states related by permutations; Dirac used 
‘indistinguishable’ in the same way; but Dirac also spoke of permutations (‘transitions’) as 
indistinguishable, rather than states. In any case, following Dirac’s work, some term was 
needed in quantum theory for particles whose states must be symmetrised; ‘indistinguishable’ 
is now common, ‘identical particles’ usually being reserved for particles that have the same 
 
elsewhere insisted that the quantum concept of indistinguishability requires the absence of trajectories (1986 
p.205-9).  
6 Pais (1982 p.371, p.63); the reference is to Boltzmann (1897 p.9). Pais shared with Bohr and his followers the 
belief that traditional ideas of objects and identity must be abandoned in quantum theory. For a detailed history 
of the identity concept in physics, sympathetic to this view, see French and Krause (2006) (which mentions 
Gibbs’ concept of generic phase only once, and in passing, p.83). 
7 Bach (1997 p.8). Bach actually showed that microstates in the sense of specific phases cannot be invariant 
under permutations (if particles are impenetrable) – see Saunders (2006). His probability distributions are all 
defined on specific phase space (Gibbs did the same, but in the name of convenience, as we shall see). 
8 And must satisfy the Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations, as claimed by e.g. Landau and Lifshitz (1958 p.204), 
Delbruck (1980 p.470), Pais (1982), and Kastler (1983 p.609). 
9 In a tradition beginning with Jammer (1966). Exceptions are Mehra and Rechenberg (1982 p.151), who 
mention him only in a footnote, and Pais, who does not mention him at all.  
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state-independent properties. Rarely can terminology in physics have been the source of so 
much misdirection. 
Clarity on this point is not only an addition to the history of quantum theory, it throws a 
radical new light on it. Progress on black-body radiation more or less stalled, circa 1911, and 
awaited Bose’s bold proposal of 1924 that the light quantum should have a state space of 
positions and momenta, just as does a material particle. That was entirely consistent with 
Gibbs’ concept of the generic phase but completely at odds with the notion of light quanta as 
indistinguishable entities in the sense of Boltzmann, Planck, and Natanson. No wonder Bose 
and Einstein were slow to remark on the connection. What was immediately apparent to 
Einstein was that Bose’s method could be applied to non-relativistic particles with mass, 
objects even more appropriately considered to have trajectories, resulting in a new equation 
of state and a new phase of matter (the Bose-Einstein condensate). If he realised that such 
particles, treated using Bose’s method, could not possibly be statistically independent of each 
other, he gave no sign. It was only in his second paper on gas theory, submitted in December 
1924, that Einstein highlighted this failure of statistical independence, even for an ideal gas 
of non-interacting particles; but still he did not make the connection with Gibbs, despite the 
fact that the generic phase also implies a failure of statistical independence, as needed to 
solve the Gibbs paradox. 
We are back to the crux of the matter: how can this connection have been missed? It was not 
only Einstein; Schrödinger, who unlike Einstein continued to work on the new statistics 
throughout 1925, missed it too. But for either to make the connection something more was 
needed: the recognition that Einstein’s great paper of 1905, ‘On a heuristic point of view 
concerning the production and transformation of light’, was in an important sense misleading. 
It purported to show that light in the Wien regime was made of statistically (or ‘mutually’)10 
independent particles, but the generic phase gives the same fluctuation formula, despite the 
failure of statistical independence. It was not a footnote they were missing, it was part of their 
footing.  
If Einstein and Schrödinger did not remark on the connection, no wonder the young Dirac 
missed it too. Dirac went on to argue that states related by exchange of identical particles 
should be identified, just as had Gibbs, not only because no experiment could distinguish 
them, but because it seemed there was no element in the new formalism of quantum 
mechanics corresponding to such an interchange. The happy coincidence of that which was 
measurable with that which was expressible in matrix mechanics was for Dirac a great virtue 
of the new theory. This seemed to shut the door on any classical analogue of the quantum 
indistinguishability concept, for classically, there are always the trajectories. But here Dirac 
too was misled: quantum trajectories of non-interacting indistinguishable particles are quite 
easily defined.11  
Since absent from all the historic papers on quantum statistics, it is hardly surprising that 
historians missed it subsequently. Gibbs, tragically, was unable to say more on the matter; he 
died unexpectedly in 1903, at the age of 64.  
It seems there is no option, in substantiating these claims, but to revisit this history in detail. 
There are three important derivations of the Planck distribution at issue: by Planck in 1900, 
by Debye in 1910, and by Bose in 1924 (a fourth, the standard derivation after 1911, is also 
briefly considered). They carry the main line of the story. But we need to revisit Einstein’s 
 
10 In Einstein (1905) it was ‘mutually independent’, in (1925) ‘statistically independent’, but Einstein made no 
comment on the shift in terminology and it is unlikely that it signified anything.  
11 See Saunders (2006, pp. 199–200), (2013 p. 358–359), Caulton (2011), Dieks and Lubberdink (2011 pp.1057-
8). 
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light quantum paper, and more, we need the 19th century background in classical statistical 
mechanics, above all concerning Gibbs’ generic phase and its relation to Boltzmann’s 
combinatoric definition of the entropy.  We start with this.  
 
2. The Classical Background 
2.1 Einstein’s concept of ‘mutual independence’ and Gibbs’ paradox 
We begin with Einstein’s own stage-setting, in 1905, for his argument for light quanta.  
According to what he called ‘the principle introduced into physics by Mr Boltzmann’, the 
entropy of a system ‘is a function of the probability of its state’, denote 𝑊. If then two 
systems A and B do not interact with each other, the thermodynamic probability 𝑊$%& of the 
state of the composite should be the product of the thermodynamic probabilities of the states 
of each taken separately. Correspondingly, the total entropy should be the sum:  𝑊$%& = 𝑊$.𝑊& ⟹ 	𝑆$%& = 𝑆$ + 𝑆&.																																												                             
This additivity of the entropy, for thermodynamic systems that are isolated from one another, 
is to this day a staple property of the entropy function however it is defined. From this 
Einstein deduced that for any entropy change:  𝑆 − 𝑆. = 𝑘 ln𝑊234																																																																													                      
where 𝑊234 is the ‘relative probability’ of the state with entropy S, with 𝑆. the initial 
entropy—the ratio of final and initial probability.12  
Einstein’s rational for additivity was that the instantaneous states of the two isolated systems 
A and B are, in his words, ‘mutually independent events’. But he applied the concept more 
widely, not just to many-particle states of isolated thermodynamic systems, but to the one-
particle states of particles that make up such systems. Thus if there are 𝑍 one-particle states 
available to a gas of	𝑁	particles, degenerate with respect to the energy, and if the probability 
of finding a particle in any one of these states is 1/𝑍, and the particles do not interact with 
each other, then the probability of finding all 𝑁 particles in a given one-particle state is 1/𝑍9 
– so again, the probabilities factorise.   
Einstein immediately put this factorizability condition to use: 
Let us consider a part of the volume 𝑉. of magnitude 𝑉  and let all 𝑁 moveable points 
be transferred into the volume 𝑉 without any other change in the system. It is obvious 
that this state has a different value of entropy (𝑆), and we now wish to determine the 
entropy difference with the aid of Boltzmann’s principle.  
We ask: How great is the probability of the last-mentioned state relative to the 
original one? Or: How great is the probability that at a randomly chosen instant of 
time all 𝑁 independently movable points in a given volume 𝑉. will be contained (by 
chance) in volume 𝑉?  
Obviously, for this probability, which is a ‘statistical probability’,13 one obtains the 
value 
 
12 Einstein used the same symbol 𝑊 for the probability of a state and for the relative probability connecting two 
states, but we shall try to keep them apart. 
13 Einstein had previously advocated an approach to the meaning of probability in physics based on sojourn 
times, and a weak notion of ergodicity (the fraction of time spent in a given state); this the ‘statistical’ 
definition.  
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𝑊234 = ;𝑉𝑉.<9 	;																																																																																														 
from this, by applying Boltzmann’s principle, one obtains 													𝑆 − 𝑆. = 𝑘 ln ;𝑉𝑉.<9.																																					 (𝑝. 96)																											(1) 
The argument is simple and suggests that the relevant state space is the Cartesian product of 
one-particle phase spaces γ   													Γ = γ × … .× γ																																																																																									(2) 
with volume measure 													𝑊 = 𝒱9																																																																																																					(3) 
where 𝒱 is the volume (Lebesgue measure) of γ (or a region of γ). For a gas in equilibrium in 
spatial volume 𝑉,  𝒱 as a dimensionless real number is of the form 𝒱 = 𝑉𝑓(𝜎)𝜏 .																																																																																							 
where	𝑓(𝜎) is a function of the intensive parameters and 𝜏 is a unit on γ with the dimensions 
of action. From Boltzmann’s principle, the entropy is then:  																							𝑆 = 𝑘 ln(𝑉𝑓(𝜎))9 − 𝑁𝑘 ln 𝜏.																																																																	(4)									 
But just this leads to the Gibbs paradox.    
The paradox is this. Let two samples of the same gas at the same temperature and pressure be 
confined to regions 𝐴 and 𝐵, separated by a partition, with available spatial volumes 𝑉$ and 𝑉& and particle numbers 𝑁$ and 𝑁&. The initial entropy 𝑆$%& is the sum of the entropies 𝑆$,𝑆& of each taken separately; 	𝑆$∪& is the equilibrium entropy after the partition is removed. 
When the two samples mix, there should be no change in entropy (at least, no change in 
entropy that can be measured). Yet a simple calculation from (4) shows that the entropy 
increases: 			𝑆$∪& − 𝑆$%& = 𝑘𝑁$ ln𝑉$ + 𝑉&𝑉$ +𝑘𝑁& ln𝑉$ + 𝑉&𝑉& .																			 
The associated thermodynamic probability 𝑊$∪& of the two gases after mixing factorises 														𝑊$∪& = 	𝒱9 = 	𝒱9R ∙ 	𝒱9T = 𝑊$ ∙ 𝑊&	,																																															(5) 
as does that for the gases with the partition in place. The relative probabilities thus also 
factorise, as follows directly from (1), applied to gas 𝐴 and 𝐵 separately (each undergoing 
free expansion into volume 𝑉). The states of the two samples of gas are mutually 
independent, in Einstein’s sense. But a non-zero entropy of mixing appears to be the 
inevitable consequence: in the case 𝑉$ = 𝑉&, the increase on removing the partition is 𝑘𝑁 ln 2, corresponding, for each particle, to a doubling in the number of accessible states in γ. It further follows that the entropy is not extensive: it does not scale with particle number 
and spatial volume, even for a homogeneous substance. So much is obvious from (3), but it 
follows from the non-zero entropy of mixing in the Gibbs set-up as well, for the gases in the 
two chambers at the moment the partition is removed just are parts of the gas as a whole. 
These are not the properties of the thermodynamic concept of entropy.  
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2.2 The generic phase and Gibbs’ paradox 
Gibbs’s solution to these conundrums lay in the generic phase. He proposed that the correct 
phase space for 𝑁 identical particles is not (2), but the space resulting from the identification 
of points in Γ representing the N particles that differ only in the permutation of particles – 
that differ only in which particle has which one-particle state in γ, as determined by sequence 
position in the Cartesian product. In more modern terms, he proposed that the correct phase-
space structure for identical particles be the quotient space of Γ under the permutation group Π: ΓW = γ × … .× γ/Π	.																																																																								 
To define this let 〈𝑞Z, 𝑝Z〉 be coordinates (position and momentum) on the kth phase space γ 
in the Cartesian product (2), , 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑁. Then a permutation 𝜋 of N particles has the action 
on Γ:  				𝜋: 〈〈𝑞^, 𝑝^〉, … 〈𝑞9, 𝑝9〉〉 → 〈〈𝑞`(^), 𝑝`(^)〉, … 〈𝑞`(9), 𝑝`(9)〉〉.			 
Because they form a group, the relation on points of Γ related by some permutation 𝜋 ∈ Π, is 
an equivalence relation. The equivalence classes under this relation are then the points of the 
quotient space ΓW. In terms of coordinates on Γ, it is the same 𝑁 pairs of positions and 
momenta, but unordered, rather than an 𝑁-tuple. If they are all distinct, a point in ΓW 
corresponds to 𝑁! distinct points in Γ, and the motion of a point in ΓW corresponds to 𝑁! 
distinct motions of points in Γ. They all describe the same 𝑁 one-particle trajectories in γ; 
they differ only in which factor position each trajectory is assigned. There is no such 
redundancy for the generic phase.  
As a transformation on Γ, the mapping 𝜋 seems no more than a renaming exercise, and hence 
an essentially trivial symmetry with only a passive interpretation, but there is a difference on 
passing to the quotient space. Not only is there a change in topology, but the beginning and 
end points of permutations actively interpreted must be identified. Smooth motions taking 
place over time, whereby two or more particles interchange their positions and momenta, can 
be described using either the specific phase or the generic phase: it is only that in the latter 
case the initial and final points of the generic phase space are one and the same. As the 
motion of a point in ΓW, it is a closed loop, whereas in Γ (for each of the corresponding 𝑁! 
motions) it is an open curve. The 𝑁! open curves all describe the same 𝑁 one-particle 
trajectories in γ, by which particles are actively interchanged. There is nothing physically 
puzzling about the generic phase, as describing those interweaving 𝑁 trajectories without any 
redundancies, although it may introduce mathematical questions as to how that is to be 
achieved. There is every reason to think that this is exactly how Gibbs understood the matter.  
To see that that the Gibbs paradox does not arise with the generic phase, suppose for 
simplicity that no two particles have exactly the same positions and momenta (such points 
anyway have Lebesgue measure zero). Then there are 𝑁! points in Γ for each point in ΓW, so 
the volume measure on ΓW is: 											𝑊c = 𝒱9𝑁! .																																																																																																				(6) 
The equilibrium entropy prior to mixing is by additivity (for the systems are initially 
isolated): 			𝑆d$%& = 𝑆d$ + 𝑆d& = 𝑘 ln𝑉$9R𝑁$! +𝑘 ln𝑉&9T𝑁&! 	+ 𝑘𝑁 ln 𝑓(𝜎) + 𝑁 ln 𝜏. 
 8 
After the partition is removed and the particles are mixed it is: 𝑆d$∪& = 𝑘 ln (𝑉$ + 𝑉&)9R%9T(𝑁$ + 𝑁&)! + 𝑘𝑁 ln 𝑓(𝜎) + 𝑁 ln 𝜏.																					 
In the Sterling approximation  ln 𝑥! ≈ 𝑥 ln 𝑥 − 𝑥																																																																																 
and given 𝑁$/𝑉$ = 𝑁&/𝑉& (as densities in the two chambers are the same) the difference in 
the two expressions vanishes. In the infinite limit (at constant density) the result is exact. 
There is no Gibbs paradox for the generic phase. 
But (6) does not factorise. Correspondingly, after mixing, (5) is not satisfied:  												𝑊c$∪& = 	𝒱(9R%9T)(𝑁$ + 𝑁&)! ≠ 	𝒱9R𝑁$! ∙ 	𝒱9T𝑁&! = 𝑊c$ ∙ 𝑊c&	.																																			(7) 
The gases, when mixed, fail Einstein’s criterion of mutual independence. Prior to mixing they 
are mutually independent, for they are separated by the partition, but not after. We come back 
to this in §4.2.  
 
2.3 Generic phase and Boltzmann’s permutability 
We have considered a simple model of the Gibbs set-up, but Gibbs in the last chapter of his 
Principles treated the generic phase in general terms. He only discussed the Gibbs set-up at 
the very end, indeed, in the very last paragraph. He concentrated rather on showing how to 
define the generic phase in terms of the various ensembles (probability distributions) he had 
introduced in earlier chapters.  
Commentators since have found this chapter cryptic,14 the book as a whole overly 
mathematical. But to readers in the German-speaking world the cardinal difficulty was that it 
appeared to be wholly inconsistent with Boltzmann’s combinatorial approach to the 
definition of thermodynamic probability, which clearly relied on the specific phase; a point 
on which Gibbs was completely silent.15 Language as such was not the difficulty (the book 
appeared in German in 1904), but translation, still, was needed.  
Boltzmann’s concept of microstate (‘complexion’) was an assignment of particular particles 
to one-particle states. If the latter are enumerated 1,2, . . , 𝑘,.. , the coarser level of description 
or macrostate (‘state distribution’) is provided by the numbers 𝑛Z (‘occupation numbers’) of 
particles in the kth state. Evidently there are    𝑊 = 𝑁!𝑛^! 𝑛j!…𝑛Z!…																																																																														 
distinct complexions for each state distribution, corresponding to all possible exchanges of 
the 𝑁 particles between (but not within) the one-particle states (hence the need to divide by 
the 𝑛Z!’s). 𝑊 was called by Boltzmann the ‘permutability’ of the state distribution.    
On normalising, Boltzmann assumed, the permutability is the probability; equivalently, he 
assumed complexions to be equiprobable. The equilibrium state distribution is then the most 
 
14 Or worse: ‘mystical’ (Van Kampen 1984 p.309), ‘the writings of an old man of rapidly failing health’ (Jaynes  
1992 p.2).   
15 In his Principles Gibbs referred to a number of Boltzmann’s writings, but not to the 1877 memoire on the 
combinatorial approach to the entropy (although he surely knew it well).  
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probable, consistent with fixed total particle number and total energy 𝐸. If  𝜀Z is the energy of 
the 𝑘mnstate, and if there are Z states in total, it is the extremal of the permutability consistent 
with the constraints:  								o𝑛ZpZq^ = 𝑁, o𝜀Z𝑛ZpZq^ = 𝐸	.																																																																		(8) 
Introducing undetermined Legendre multipliers for each of the constraint equations (the 
second to be identified as the temperature) Boltzmann had been able to derive, or rederive, 
some of his most important equations.   
To all this, the difficulty posed by Gibbs’ notion of generic phase is obvious. Complexions 
are specific phases; using generic phases instead, the permutability is always unity. A 
microstate (generic phase) only reports the number of particles in each one-particle state, not 
which particles are in which state. A state distribution just is a microstate. The idea makes 
nonsense of Boltzmann’s combinatorial method – or so it seemed.  
Still, we can say more about their connection. Consider first the relation of the permutability 
to the specific phase space measure (3). As before, let there be 𝑍 coarse-grained one-particle 
states, but now degenerate with respect to the energy, each of them equiprobable. Then there 
are 𝑍9 available microstates, all of the same energy, all equiprobable. But equally, we can 
collect together those microstates with the same state distribution 𝒏 = {𝑛^, . . , 𝑛p} (𝑊 in all), 
and then sum the permutabilities. The result must be the same:   							 o 𝑁!𝑛^! 𝑛j!…𝑛p!𝒏;	∑ wxyxz{ q9	 = 𝑍9.																																																																				(9) 
Indeed, if the 𝑛Z’s are non-negative integers, (9) is an arithmetical identity.  
There is an analogous combinatorial treatment for Gibbs’ volume measure (6). Under the 
same coarse graining, and the same assumption of degeneracy of the energy, the total number 
of available microstates just is the total number of state distributions, but now without the 
weightings (the permutabilities) in (9). It is the number: 										 o 1𝒏;	∑ wxyxz{ q9	 = (𝑁 + 𝑍 − 1)!(𝑍 − 1)!𝑁! 	.																																																																				(10) 
For non-negative 𝑛Z’s, this too is an arithmetical identity. To obtain the connection with (6), 
observe that for 𝑍 ≫ 𝑁: 											(𝑁 + 𝑍 − 1)!(𝑍 − 1)!𝑁! ≈ 𝑍9𝑁! 																																																																																											(11) 
in agreement with (6) for 𝒱 ≈ 𝑍.  
The identity (10) is so important to our history that we do well to prove it explicitly. Observe 
that any ordered sequence of 𝑍 − 1 vertical strokes and 𝑁 crosses determines a unique 
microstate satisfying the constraints (8), a unique set of occupation numbers, and 
conversely.16 There are (𝑁 + 𝑍 − 1)! possible orderings of 𝑁 + 𝑍 − 1 distinct symbols, but 
since only two are distinct we must divide by the number of permutations of the ×’s among 
 
16 Thus, to illustrate, for 𝑍 =7, 𝑁 = 6 the sequence ×× | × || ×× | × |	determines the state distribution 𝑛^ =2, 𝑛j = 1, 𝑛" = 0, 𝑛 = 2, 𝑛 = 1, 𝑛 = 0, and conversely. 
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themselves (𝑁! in all), and by the number of permutations of the |’s among themselves 
((𝑍 − 1)! in all), yielding (10). Call this the ‘symbol-sequence argument’ for future 
reference.17  
But the fact remains: every state distribution is equally probable. How, using Gibbs’ generic 
phase, can Boltzmann’s results be explained? Whether or not this simple difficulty was the 
reason Gibbs’ concept of generic phase was found so baffling, there is no doubt that it was 
found baffling. Alas, Gibbs did not live to explain. 
The key to reconciling the two is to draw a distinction between macrostate and microstate of 
a rather more robust kind – and one that is also to be found in Boltzmann’s 1877 memoire. It 
figured in Gibbs’ writings as well, and in the Ehrenfests’ celebrated encyclopaedia article, 
‘The Conceptual Foundations of the Statistical Approach in Mechanics’ of 1912, although in 
a singularly unhelpful form. The distinction is based on the idea not of a single coarse-
graining of the one-particle phase space γ into regions degenerate with respect to the energy, 
but two: a further, finer-grained level of description of each region, in terms of cells. The 
former must be large enough to contain many particles, so that the Sterling approximation 
can be applied to the occupation numbers, but small enough so they all have approximately 
the same energy (this can always be arranged by increasing the spatial volume). They were 
called ‘elementary regions’ by Einstein in 1925, and we follow his usage (sometimes 
abbreviated to ‘regions’). At the fine-grained level, however, Sterling’s approximation is not 
needed, and the cells can be taken as small as desired (𝜏 can be taken as small as desired – so 
that its size makes no difference to entropy differences).  
Let the elementary regions be parameterised by 𝑠 = 1,2, … , and let region 𝑠 contain 𝑧 fine-
grained cells, each of equal phase space volume 𝜏 in γ. If 𝑛 particles are independently 
distributed over 𝑧 cells (specific phase), degenerate with respect to the energy, there is no 
further constraint on the microstate, so the number of accessible microstates is given by (9):   				𝑊 = 𝑧w.																																																																																																				(12) 
Considering all regions s, and for a fixed partition of the total number 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑛  of particles 
into groups of 𝑛 particles, the total number of microstates is just the product of the 𝑊 :    													𝑧w 	.																																																																																																							(13)								 
But there are many ways the N particles may be partitioned into groups of 𝑛 particles – 
precisely Boltzmann’s permutability, where now the elementary regions play the role 
previously played by cells. The total number of distinct microstates is therefore: 					𝑊 = 𝑁!𝑛^! 𝑛j!…𝑛!…𝑧w .																																																																		(14) 
If now we set up the same model using the generic phase, we replace (12) by (10) for each 
elementary region, and obtain instead of (13) the product over regions 𝑠  						𝑊 =(𝑧 + 𝑛 − 1)!(𝑧 − 1)! 𝑛! 	.																																																																											(15) 
 
17 It first appeared in Ehrenfest and Kamerlingh-Onnes (1914). Ehrenfest wrote to Lorentz that he will laugh at 
the proof  ‘as at a joke’, and that ‘it was a lot of fun for us, and everyone who saw it’ (quoted by Darrigol 1991 
p.253); but he was unamused by those who took seriously the idea of the energy elements as things, as we shall 
see.   
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There is of course no further permutability factor, for the generic phase, as was introduced in 
(14), corresponding to permutations of particles between different regions, for particle 
permutations between different regions do not introduce any additional states, no more than 
they do within regions. If we now take the limit 𝑧 ≫ 𝑛, as classically we should, we obtain 	𝑊 ≈𝑧w𝑛! 	.																																																																																									(16) 
The result is identical, apart from the unwanted overall factor 𝑁!, with Boltzmann’s 
permutability (14). The troublesome 𝑁!, spoiling extensivity, is removed. It had been 
frequently dropped by Boltzmann without any comment,18 but here it has a principled 
rational. The standard procedure of maximising (14) to determine the equilibrium state 
applies to (16) just as well. Boltzmann’s combinatorial method is entirely consistent with 
Gibbs’ generic phase, differing only in the overall factor 𝑁!. 
The apparent contradiction between the generic phase and Boltzmann’s combinatorial 
method is thus fairly easily removed. But paradoxically, it became harder to make out after 
Planck’s discovery of 1900, because his derivation of the radiation formula hinged on the use 
of Eq.(10) and on not taking the limit 𝑧 ≫ 𝑛. This combinatorics factor, whilst well-known 
to Boltzmann and to Gibbs, was following Planck’s discovery imbued with a new and 
mysterious significance, in a context that seemed to have nothing to do with Gibbs paradox 
or the extensivity of the entropy. It became, along with Planck’s constant, a signature of the 
quantum, alien to classical theory.  
Whether for this reason, or by oversight, the correspondence just set out appears to have been 
missed by everyone working on quantum theory, meaning, by 1911, almost everyone. It was 
clearly missed by the Ehrenfests, for whilst they compared certain aspects of Gibbs’ approach 
to Boltzmann‘s, they did not comment on the generic phase.  They wrote down (14) but with 
the added (and unwarranted) assumption 𝑧 = 𝜔 for all s, with the result that the 
correspondence between (14) and (16) was completely invisible.19 Had they understood it 
they would not have thus concealed it. It was surely missed by Lorentz and the young Hugo 
Tetrode, in 1914. Tetrode had suggested that the division by 𝑁! had been explained by Gibbs, 
a point that Lorentz found questionable. Certainly the needed correspondence Eq.(12)-(16) 
was not to be found in Gibbs’ writings. Nor could the argument have been abbreviated; for 
example, it would have been self-defeating to divide the permutability Eq.(14) by 𝑁! on the 
simple ground that the particles are exactly similar, so that permutations of complexions did 
not count, for that would remove the basis of introducing the permutabilities in the first place. 
Tetrode acquiesced in Lorentz’s criticism20, and even when the correspondence (12)-(15) was 
eventually brought out into the open, by Einstein in 1925, the crucial link, Eq.(16), was 
absent. The point still was not made.  
There is another feature of this correspondence of great importance to our story. Eq.(15), (16) 
show two quite distinct senses in which the permutation of particles leaves the generic phase 
unchanged. One takes place within a given region, where the interchange of particles of 
approximately the same energies (momenta, location) among cells leave the microstate 
 
18Ehrenfest and Trkal (1920) subsequently gave it a rational using Boltzmann’s ideas ; but pace van Kampen 
(1984), whilst it offers a solution to the extensivity puzzle, it does not in itself solve the Gibbs paradox. 
Swendsen has recently worked it up in this way, but with a heavy dependence on probabilistic concepts 
(Swendsen 2018).  
19 As a result ∏ 𝑧w = 𝜔9 in Eq.(14), a constant like 𝜏 that can be discarded (Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest, 1912 
p.27). 
20 Declaring the reason for dividing the permutability by 𝑁! to be  ‘a difficulty question’; see Darrigol (1991 
p.276-7) for further discussion.  
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unchanged (hence the division by 𝑛! for each s, here as in (6)). The other takes place 
between regions, where particles of very different energies (momenta, locations) are 
interchanged, that likewise do not produce a new microstate (hence the absence of the 
permutability). In the former case the particles involved have approximately the same 
properties; they are indistinguishable in the everyday, epistemic sense. But in the latter case 
the interchanged particles are from completely different regions of 𝛾, and as such they have 
completely different positions and momenta. They are manifestly distinguishable, in the 
epistemic sense. That is: particles indistinguishable in Gibbs’ sense, using the generic phase, 
may differ wildly in their state-dependent properties, as determined by different regions in 𝛾; 
it is only their state-independent properties that must be the same.  
 
2.4 Gibbs on indistinguishability 
Can we safely attribute this concept to Gibbs? He was not entirely explicit on the matter. The 
question of whether to use the specific or generic phase he thought a matter of ‘practical 
convenience’. He settled on the generic phase, but went on to use his ensemble method to 
define probability distributions (and equilibrium distributions) using an ensemble of gasses 
each defined by a specific phase. The ensemble was an imaginary collective, the members 
mere ‘creatures of the imagination’, and as such  
The perfect similarity of several particles of a system will not in the least interfere 
with the identification of a particular particle in one case with a particular particle in 
another. (p.188).  
This may have suggested to his readers that points of the N-particle generic phase space 
cannot even be imagined other than in terms of specific phases – that the generic phase of a 
gas can only mean a certain ensemble of gases, each with a definite specific phase (a 
probability distribution on specific phase space, as understood by Bach). But I suggest we 
should take Gibbs rather more at his word: it was a question of convenience.  
We earlier gave a simple counting argument for the relation between the two volume 
measures (3) and (6) on Γ and ΓW respectively. For an analytical proof of the kind that Gibbs 
was familiar with, consider the simple case of a 1-dimensional interval of the reals 𝜆 = [𝑎, 𝑏] 
in place of γ. Let  〈𝑥^, … , 𝑥9〉	be Cartesian coordinates on ℝ9, and hence on Λ = 𝜆 × …× 𝜆. 
The quotient space Λc under the permutation group for N particles Π9 can then be defined as 
the set of points {〈𝑥^, … , 𝑥9〉 ; 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥^ ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑥9 ≤ 𝑏}, so the ordering no longer specifies 
which particle has which coordinate.21 There is only the trivial action of the permutation 
group on Λc  (as the identity). The volume measure is:  𝑑𝜇 	≝c 	  … 𝑑𝑥^ …𝑑𝑥9 = (𝑏 − 𝑎)9𝑁! 																													 
 (in agreement with Eq.(6)). Thus for 𝑁 = 2, given two real numbers 𝑥, 𝑥′, 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏, 𝑎 ≤𝑥′ ≤ 𝑏, we write 𝑥^ = 𝑥, 𝑥j = 𝑥′ if  𝑥 ≤ 𝑥′, and 𝑥^ = 𝑥′, 𝑥j = 𝑥 otherwise. No labelling of 
particles is involved (Figure 1). 
 
21 If coincidences are excluded, we use the simplex 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥^ < ⋯ < 𝑥9 ≤ 𝑏 instead.  
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(i)                                                          (ii) 
Figure 1: 2-particle phase space. Coordinates for the shaded region in (i) consist of ordered 
pairs of real numbers (specific phase); for (ii), they are defined by unordered pairs of real 
numbers (generic phase). 
 
The correspondence gives a simple ansatz for determining averages of functions on the 
quotient space, as for any completely symmetric function 𝑓: 𝜆9 → ℝ:  𝑓𝑑𝜇 	=c 	 1𝑁!  … 𝑓(𝑥^, … , 𝑥9)𝑑𝑥^ …𝑑𝑥9 	.																																												 
This is surely what Gibbs had in mind when he said, in favour of using the specific phase 
(and simply dividing by 𝑁! at the end): 
For the analytical description of a specific phase is more simple than that of a generic 
phase. And it is a more simple matter to make a multiple integral extend over all 
possible specific phases than to make one extend without repetition over all possible 
generic phases. (p.188) 
There can be no doubt that Gibbs advocated identifying phases that differed by permutations 
alone. When he did, finally, come to the mixing of like gases, he concluded:  
It is evident, therefore, that it is equilibrium with respect to generic phases, and not 
with respect to specific, with which we have to do in the evaluation of the entropy 
(p.207).  
He used the term ‘indistinguishable’ only once, at the beginning of the chapter:22 
If two phases differ only in that certain entirely similar particles have changed places 
with one another, are they to be regarded as identical or different phases? If the 
particles are regarded as indistinguishable, it seems in accordance with the spirit of 
the statistical method to regard the phases as identical.  
He almost certainly meant ‘indistinguishable in their state-independent properties’. In his 
great memoire of 1875, ‘On the Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Substances’, Gibbs had 
 
22 Gibbs (1902 p.187); this appears to be the first use of the term ‘indistinguishable’ in the context of 
permutation invariance. Quoting a passage from Planck (1901), Kuhn (1978 p.121, 286) translates ‘indifferente’ 
as ‘indistinguishable’, but in a different context, and ‘nicht unterscheidbar’ and ‘nicht zu unterscheiden’ are the 
standard German terms today. Natanson used ‘unterschiedslos gleich’ (indiscriminately alike) in his German 
publication, but ‘undistinguishable’ in the English version (1911), probably picked up from Gibbs’ earlier 
writings.  
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spoken of microstates as indistinguishable (‘undistinguishable’) if they differ only by 
permutations. He then had the epistemic concept in mind: they did not differ in their ‘sensible 
properties’. But in his final work it seems it was not the epistemic notion, for he toyed with 
the idea that generic phases might be defined so as to take no account of what he called 
‘equivalent positions’, meaning states degenerate with respect to the energy, also sensibly the 
same. He decided against it: the only difference from specific phases lay in the absence of 
data as to which particle has which position and momentum. 
To conclude, with respect to the question as posed, if we may not safely attribute our realist 
concept to Gibbs, it is certainly reasonable to read him in this way – and so might have his 
contemporaries. Alas, at least in the German-speaking world, Gibbs’ concept of the generic 
phase was widely dismissed as conventionalist, or operationalist, or anti-realist, or idealist, or 
just frankly incoherent, to be contrasted with Boltzmann’s realism.23  
 
2.5 Indistinguishability in Boltzmann’s writings 
Ludwig Boltzmann, in his great study of 1877, has himself been attributed the concept of 
particle indistinguishability, for as a prelude to defining a coarse-graining (and indeed a fine-
graining) of the one-particle state space 𝛾 (into regions of position and momentum), he 
coarse-grained the total energy 𝐸, in an idealised model in which three-dimensional space 
was absent altogether. Given a unit 𝜀 of energy, small in comparison to 𝐸, he defined what he 
called a ‘geometric progression’ 0, 𝜀, 2𝜀, . . 𝑃𝜀 with 𝑃𝜀 = 𝐸; the members of this progression 
he called ‘energy elements’. A microstate (complexion) is a specification of the energy 
element assigned each particle (allowing for repetitions), summing to 𝑃𝜀. A state distribution 
specifies the numbers of particles assigned each energy-element, and the equilibrium 
distribution is the one realised by the greatest number of microstates. Boltzmann imagined 
his complexions to be selected at random, using a ball and urn model of probability.24 
In terms of our earlier remarks on Boltzmann’s method, this model amounted to the choice of 
one-particle energies 𝜀Z = 𝑘𝜀, with 𝑘 a non-negative integer, of total energy 𝐸 = 𝑃𝜀. But as 
such it was easily translated into another model, in which there is a multiplicity of 𝑃 
elements, each of identical magnitude 𝜀 (and we shall use ‘energy grade’ henceforward for 
members of Boltzmann’s progression 0, 𝜀, 2𝜀, . . 𝑃𝜀). A microstate can then be redescribed as 
the specification of the number of energy elements 𝜀 assigned each particle where there is no 
distinction as to which is assigned which particle. It is only a redescription: they are still 
complexions, and the state distributions are the same, save that the enumeration begins with 
the zero (to indicate the state of zero energy) and terminates in 𝑃 (as the state of the greatest 
possible energy grade 𝑃𝜀). The permutability is: 														 𝑁!𝑛.! 𝑛j!…𝑛¢!																																																																																																		(17)	 
and the particle number and energy constraints are:  o𝑛Z	¢Zq. = 𝑁, o𝑘𝑛Z	¢Zq. = 𝑃.																																																													 
As before, microstates (complexions) must be equiprobable (or of equal phase-space volume) 
if relative numbers of microstates are to determine relative probabilities (or ratios of phase-
 
23 See Darrigol (2018) for a systematic survey, to the same broad effect.  
24 As such the draws could not be independent, as Boltzmann noted, as the energy constraint has to be satisfied. 
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space volumes). The total number of microstates then provides a normalisation constant. 
Boltzmann wrote down without comment the binomial coefficient: 	£𝑁 + 𝑃 − 1𝑃 ¤ = (𝑁 + 𝑃 − 1)!(𝑁 − 1)! 𝑃! .																																																																	(18) 
He almost certainly had worked out the third and most surprising of the arithmetical identities 
important to our story, the identity, for non-negative numbers 𝑛Z, of (18) with:  o 𝑁!𝑛.! 𝑛^!…𝑛¢!𝒏;	∑ wx¥xz¦ q9,			 ∑ Zwxq¢¥xz{ 		 	.																																																		(19) 
It follows directly from Boltzmann’s reasoning that (19) is the total number of microstates 
(complexions) of N (distinguishable) particles, with total energy 𝑃𝜀; and it is an arithmetical 
identity that this number is (18)  (it was called ‘the number of combinations with 
repetitions’25). But there is the simpler route: consider the microstate as a distribution of 𝑃 
energy units 𝜀 over the 𝑁 (distinguishable) particles, without regard to which energy unit is 
assigned which particle. The total number of microstates of this kind, energetically 
accessible, is just the number of microstates for 𝑃 (indistinguishable) units distributed over N 
(distinguishable) particles – or N (distinguishable) one-particle states – the only constraint 
being the total number 𝑃. The result is an instance of the identity (10), save for the 
interchange of the roles of particles and one-particle states:  	 o 1𝒏;	∑ wxxz{ q¢				 = (𝑁 + 𝑃 − 1)!(𝑁 − 1)! 𝑃! .																																																														(20) 
There is evidently a duality between the two descriptions: (distinguishable) particles assigned 
energy-grades, with microstates counted by (19), and (indistinguishable) energy elements 
assigned (distinguishable) particles or one-particle states, with microstates counted by (20). It 
was the shift made by Planck in 1900 when he wrote down the binomial (18), citing 
Boltzmann’s 1877 paper. 
In this way the indistinguishability concept has been traced to Boltzmann.26 But understood 
in this way, it is the indistinguishability of the energy elements 𝜀, entities that are exactly 
alike in all of their properties (basically, only energy). It is not the Gibbs concept, it is not 
even the epistemic concept; it might be called the Planck concept, as Planck was the first to 
talk in this way, albeit not for long. For Boltzmann, of course, the energy elements or grades 
were mere calculational devices, of no physical significance, for the unit 𝜀, like 𝜏, was 
arbitrary. 
How much of the foregoing was known to our protagonists, and when? Gibbs, probably, 
knew all of it. Boltzmann knew much, but he may have missed Gibbs’ concept of generic 
phase, for his life too was cut short.27 The two giants of statistical mechanics abruptly left the 
stage, just as the story of the quantum properly got going. Planck was well-versed in 
combinatorics formula, but his knowledge of Boltzmann’s writings was, as Kuhn put it, 
 
25 For example, by Netto (1898 p.29), where it is listed as one of four ‘standard formula’ of the new field of 
combinatorics. See Kuhn (1978 pp.282-3) for further commentary. 
26 Bach (1990) defends this reading of Boltzmann; Monaldi (2009 p.385) cautions against it, as do Sharp and 
Matschinky (2015), 
27 Boltzmann was inactive in his later years, and took his own life in 1906. 
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‘spotty’28; much more so of Gibbs’. Ehrenfest was critical of Gibbs’ Principles and sought 
other solutions to the extensivity puzzle; he ignored the Gibbs paradox.  So did Einstein, who 
having discovered a number of Gibbs’ results independently, came late to the Principles. 
Peter Debye was an early champion of Gibbs’ approach to statistical mechanics, and in 1910 
he wrote down a symmetrised version of Eq.(15) for the total count of microstates of the 
radiation field; but he was unwilling to take energy quanta (as he called them) as things, and 
he missed the approximation (11), and with it the connection to generic phase. In other 
writings he cited Gibbs in justification for the division by 𝑁!, and on this point won a convert 
in Planck, but neither he nor Planck thought it related to the quantum or to black-body 
radiation.29  
Gibbs left a precious legacy for the discoverers of the quantum, but it was not received. The 
history of discovery would have been quite different had it been.   
 
3. Planck’s Black-body Radiation Formula 
3.1: Planck’s Discovery 
Planck’s route to the black-body formula has been widely documented and we shall be brief. 
He modelled matter in thermal equilibrium with radiation at frequency 𝜈 in terms of a 
material harmonic oscillator, termed ‘resonator’, with natural frequency 𝜈. On the basis of an 
elaborate electrodynamical argument Planck concluded that the mean oscillator energy U 
must be related to the equilibrium radiation energy density 𝜌 as:  																𝜌 = 8𝜋𝑣j𝑐" 𝑈.																																																																																																						(21) 
Wilhelm Wien had some years earlier deduced certain constraints on 𝜌 on general 
thermodynamical grounds, and had proposed the simplest candidate with bounded energy, the 
Wien black-body distribution:   																𝜌 = 𝛼𝑣"𝑒®¯°/±	.																																																																																															(22) 
This introduced two new dimensional constants 𝛼 and 𝛽, independent of frequency; it was 
this that excited Planck’s interest. But although initially successful, it was clear by the 
summer of 1900 that Wien’s law failed at high temperatures and low frequencies (the 
Rayleigh-Jeans regime), where 𝜌 appeared to depend linearly on the temperature. Using the 
same combination of simplicity and guesswork that had guided Wien, Planck proposed the 
new formula, the Planck black-body distribution: 						𝜌 = 8𝜋𝑣j𝑐" 	 ℎ𝑣𝑒n°/Z± − 1.																																																																																				 
For ℎ𝑣 ≫ 𝑘𝑇, the Planck distribution goes over to the Wien distribution. Planck had earlier 
tried to derive the Wien law from first principles (and, embarrassingly, had claimed to 
succeed), and now set out to derive his new distribution law. From the first law of 
thermodynamics  𝑑𝑈 = 𝑇𝑑𝑆 + 𝑝𝑑𝑉																																																																																						 
 
28 Kuhn (1978 p.100) observes that Planck had prepared the thirteenth lecture of Kirchhoff’s Theory of Heat for 
posthumous publication in 1894, which, unusually for the time, contained a detailed combinatorial derivation of 
Maxwell’s velocity distribution.  
29Debye (1910a), Planck (1915, 1921).  
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the entropy S of the resonators must satisfy the fundamental relation:  									𝑑𝑆𝑑𝑈´µq¶·wm = 1𝑇	.																																																																																										(23) 
Using Planck’s distribution law to express 1/T first as a function of 𝜌, and then from (21) as a 
function of U, Eq.(23) is readily integrated to give the entropy of the resonator:30 							𝑆 = 𝑘 ; 𝑈ℎ𝑣 + 1< ln ; 𝑈ℎ𝑣 + 1< − 𝑘 𝑈ℎ𝑣 ln 𝑈ℎ𝑣.																																											(24) 
Conversely, from (21), (23), and (24), the Planck distribution followed. The latter was 
holding up to experiment beautifully, the other equations followed from well-known physical 
principles; Planck had only to justify Eq.(24).  
There followed, said Planck in his Nobel prize lecture in 1918, ‘the most strenuous work of 
my life’. We know he was eventually led to Boltzmann’s 1877 memoire, for he cited it. 
Whether he there first found Boltzmann’s binomial coefficient for the total number of 
microstates, or elsewhere – or, whether, indeed, as Kuhn has suggested, he worked directly 
from (24) – is disputed.31 On writing down the expression (18), he noted that in the Sterling 
approximation its logarithm multiplied by Boltzmann’s constant is:   													𝑘 ln (𝑁 + 𝑃 − 1)!(𝑁 − 1)! 𝑃! ≈ 𝑁𝑘 ¸;𝑃𝑁 + 1< ln ;𝑃𝑁 + 1< − 𝑃𝑁 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑁º.											(25)								 
The similarity with (24) leaps to the eye. Suppose, indeed, there are N resonators, all with the 
same entropy (24), and suppose that the total entropy is the sum of the individual entropies. 
Then the entropy of the resonators is:  𝑁𝑘 ¸; 𝑈ℎ𝑣 + 1< ln ; 𝑈ℎ𝑣 + 1< − 𝑈ℎ𝑣 ln 𝑈ℎ𝑣º																																																			 
an expression identical to (25) if:  𝑃𝑁 = 𝑈ℎ𝑣																																																																																																												 
that is, if 𝑃 = 𝑈𝑁/ℎ𝑣 = 	𝐸/ℎ𝑣, where 𝐸 is the energy of the 𝑁 resonators. Planck had only 
to choose in place of Boltzmann’s (arbitrary) unit	𝜀 the quantum of energy ℎ𝑣.   
Planck had the answer to a combinatorial problem, namely the Boltzmann binomial; he had 
only to find the problem. Here it is, in Planck’s words: 
If 𝐸 is considered as an infinitely divisible quantity, the distribution can be made in an 
infinite number of ways. However, we consider– and this is the most important point 
of the whole calculation – 𝐸 as being composed of a completely definite number of 
finite equal parts, and make use for that purpose the natural constant ℎ =6.55	 × 10®j» erg sec. This constant, when multiplied by the common frequency of 
the resonators, yields the energy element ℎ𝑣 in ergs; and by dividing 𝐸 by ℎ𝑣, we 
obtain 𝑃, the number of energy elements which have to be distributed among the 𝑁 
resonators. (Planck 1900 239-40).  
 
30 This follows Kuhn’s now widely-accepted reconstruction of Planck’s route to his discovery.  
31 Mehra and Rechenberg (1982 p. 50) trace it to Boltzmann, and give arguments against Kuhn’s suggestion. 
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The number of ways in which this can be done is given by Boltzmann’s binomial (18) 
(although Planck gave no proof). From this and Boltzmann’s principle, Eq.(25) follows, and 
with it the Planck distribution.  
As we saw, Boltzmann in 1877 had spoken of an ‘energy element’ (energy-grade) as an 
integral multiple of the unit, the energy assigned a particle, a member of the progression 0, 𝜀, 2𝜀, … , 𝑃𝜀, with 𝑃 = 𝐸/𝜀. Planck used ‘ energy element’ to mean the unit itself, and the 
plural to mean a multitude of units -- he spoke of the energy ‘as composed of a definite 
number of finite equal parts’. He explains the expression (18) in terms of the number of 
distinct ‘complexions’ (microstates), borrowing Boltzmann’s term for what he is careful to 
call a ‘similar concept’. We have previewed these shifts already. They were slight and easily 
made, but they carried the suggestion that the energy elements 𝜀 might be thought of as 
objects in their own right, and indeed as exactly indistinguishable from each other, not just 
indistinguishable in the epistemic sense.  
This was not a picture that Planck especially liked or even intended, 32 and in his Gas 
Lectures of 1906 he offered another (that we need not consider here). There was much else 
that was puzzling. He had hitherto been content with a single resonator in each frequency 
range, but now invoked large numbers (needed to ensure the Sterling approximation was 
valid), without explanation. More confusingly, Planck used for the count of microstates what 
was for Boltzmann an overall normalisation factor for converting permutabilities W to 
genuine probabilities. Correlatively, Planck did not seem to be extremalising anything: in 
what way was he deriving the equilibrium distribution for his resonators? He did allude to the 
more coarse-grained macrostate, whereby different energies were to be assigned to each 
‘group’ of resonators (for each frequency range), with the total number of microstates given 
by the product of the W’s (for each group); in this way he hinted at an expression of the form 
(15) (but did not write it down). His Annalen derivation submitted two months later differed 
from this sketch in significant respects.33 Planck had made the discovery of the century, but 
he had no idea what it meant.  
 
3.2 The Debye Model 
The following decade saw repeated attempts to place Planck’s black-body law on a sounder 
footing, including by Planck. The quantisation of energy, in units ℎ𝑣, featured in almost all of 
them. 
By the time of the Solvay Conference of 1911, the first international conference on the new 
quantum theory, it seemed that Planck’s law could be placed on a satisfactory footing in two 
quite distinct ways, both of which traced the quantum discontinuity to the unknown laws of 
atoms and molecules, impacting, through energy transfers with matter, only derivatively on 
radiation. The first was due to Debye, dispensing with Planck’s resonator equation, modelling 
 
32 As emphasised by Kuhn (1978), who makes a persuasive case that despite Planck’s language, he did not even 
think the energies of individual resonators were quantised until about 1909. Planck’s phrasing at this time may 
only have reflected the easier combinatorial route to the Boltzmann expression (with some version of the 
symbol-sequence derivation), rather than the cumbersome ‘combination with repetitions’ route, also in keeping 
with Kuhn (1978 p.127-30). 
33 There Planck considered only resonators in a single frequency range, and assumed equilibrium was already 
established (with the entropy given, as before, by the logarithm of the Boltzmann expression). From the Wien 
displacement law he then deduced 𝑃 = 	𝐸/ℎ𝑣.  
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the radiation field directly. Normal modes of the electrodynamic field in a given spatial 
volume replaced Planck’s material resonators (and were just as distinguishable). The second 
was due to several authors but was first sketched by Planck34 and Einstein in 1905 and 1906, 
using Planck’s resonator equation, and in more detail by Lorentz in 1909. By 1911 this had 
become something of an orthodoxy.35 In this approach only material harmonic oscillators 
figured (and again were perfectly distinguishable). In neither approach were the energy 
quanta regarded as objects in their own right. 
Debye formulated his guiding idea in terms of what he called the ‘elementary quantum 
hypothesis’:  
The …major difference [with conventional gas theory] is the application of the 
elementary quantum hypothesis, which is analogous to that of Liouville's theorem. 
Just as the latter determines the transfer of energy from one degree of freedom to 
another in collisions, the former hypothesis in radiation theory makes it possible to 
ascertain the corresponding amount of energy transferred from one wavelength to 
another, provided it is caused by a material body.36 
He proposed to make use of nothing else – and in particular, to make no use of Planck’s 
resonator equation (21), based as it was on Lorentz’s electrodynamics.  
As was then well-known, if the electromagnetic field is treated as a collection of 
monochromatic waves or modes, subject to simple boundary conditions for volume V, the 
number of modes in the frequency range [𝑣, 𝑣 + ∆𝑣] is: 			𝑛∆𝑣 = 8𝜋𝑣j𝑐" 𝑉∆𝑣	.																																																																														(26) 
In 1902 James Jeans had shown that this number is independent of the shape of the cavity. 
Debye called the collection of normal modes for volume 𝑉 and frequencies in the range [𝑣, 𝑣 + ∆𝑣] the ‘Jeans cube’. On the basis of his quantum hypothesis, he supposed the 
energies of the modes in the cube to be integral multiples of ℎ𝑣, what he called ‘quanta’. He 
defined a macrostate as a function 𝑓(𝑣), specifying the number of quanta for each mode of 
frequency 𝑣; the combinatorics problem was to calculate the number of ways of distributing 𝑓(𝑣)𝑛(𝑣)∆𝑣 (= 𝑃) quanta over 𝑛(𝑣)∆𝑣  (= 𝑁) normal modes of the  Jeans cube. Referring 
to Planck (1900), but with no other comment, he wrote down the answer as: 										𝑊° = (𝑁 + 𝑃)!𝑁! 𝑃! = (𝑛∆𝑣 + 𝑓𝑛∆𝑣)!(𝑛∆𝑣)! (𝑓𝑛∆𝑣)!																																																	(27)							 
and for the total number of microstates (compare Eq.15):  				𝑊 =(𝑛∆𝑣 + 𝑓𝑛∆𝑣)!(𝑛∆𝑣)! (𝑓𝑛∆𝑣)!° 	.																																																																(28) 
 
34 Planck went on to modify the theory to allow continuous energy absorption, but discontinuous emission (his 
so-called ‘second theory’), an approach that eventually led to half-integral values of the energy (and a zero-point 
energy). It was this that appeared in the second edition of his Lectures.  
35 Although based on Planck’s resonator equation, and hence on Lorentz’s electrodynamics, it was thought it 
may still have a statistical validity. Not by Einstein, who pointed out that it required a mean resonator energy (of 
order 𝑘𝑇) much greater than the energy unit, whereas in the Wien limit it was much smaller (1906 p.198). 
36 Debye (1910b p.1431); Einstein might have stated the quantum hypothesis similarly, but without the final 
proviso.  
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This was to be maximised to determine the equilibrium macrostate 𝑓(̅𝑣), subject to the 
energy constraint: 𝐸 =oℎ𝑣𝑓𝑛∆𝑣° .																																																																																		 
Replacing the sum by the integral and substituting for 𝑛∆𝑣 from (26) it follows: 𝐸 = ¾`n¶¿ ∫ 𝑣"𝑓𝑑𝑣Á. .																																																																														                
If the logarithm of W is a maximum under variation of f, it must satisfy the equation:  ln(1 + 𝑓)̅ − ln 𝑓̅ = 𝛽ℎ𝑣																																																																						 
where 𝛽 is the undetermined Lagrange multiplier for the energy constraint. The entropy for 
the equilibrium macrostate must satisfy the analogue of Eq.(8), fixing 𝛽 as 1/𝑘𝑇. Therefore:  𝑓(̅𝑣) = 1𝑒n°/Z± − 1																																																																														 
and the Planck distribution follows immediately from Eq.(26). 
The crucial expression is Eq.(28), a product of symmetrised Bolzmann binomials (18) 
(replacing N-1 by N), one for each frequency range. Writing 𝑛Â = 𝑓(𝜈)𝑧(𝜈)Δ𝜈 as the number 
of quanta in the frequency range [𝜈, 𝜈 + Δ𝜈], and 𝑧Â = 𝑛(𝜈)Δ𝜈 as the number of  modes, or 
‘receptacles’, we can rewrite (28) as:  𝑊 =(𝑛Â + 𝑧Â)!𝑛Â! 𝑧Â!° 																																																																													 
whereupon the comparison with Eq.(15) is transparent. There are no additional microstates 
corresponding to the interchange of quanta between different frequency ranges, but then it 
occurred to no-one, at this time, that quanta were things that could change continuously in 
time, so as to interchange their properties. The modes of the field were the physical entities 
for Debye. Bose was to invert this, and take the quanta as the physical things, and the modes 
of the field as one-particle states. For the Jeans cube, these states are approximately 
degenerate with respect to the energy, and the derivation of (15) applies immediately.  
 
3.3 The Solvay Model 
The third derivation of the black-body formula that we shall consider prior to Bose’s used a 
different strategy to achieve the same end: to confine the quantum discontinuity to the 
unknown dynamics of molecules, preserving Maxwell’s equations unchanged. The beauty of 
this approach was that save for the quantisation of the energy of the molecules (Planck’s 
resonators) its credentials were impeccable; it was clearly based on Boltzmann’s principles, 
whilst avoiding the troublesome Boltzmann binomial, Eq.(18). It remains standard pedagogy 
to this day. For brevity we shall call it ‘the Solvay model’. 
Let there be 𝑁 (distinguishable) objects, and let a state distribution as before be defined by 
the number 𝑛Z of objects with energy 𝑘𝜀, with total energy 𝐸 = 𝑃𝜀, subject to the constraints 
(8) with 𝜀Z = 𝑘𝜀. A microstate is the specification of the energy of each object (one of the 
elements {0, 𝜀, 2𝜀, … , 𝑃𝜀}). The permutability is as before, Eq.(17). Assuming, as usual, the 
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validity of the Sterling approximation, the entropy is:   𝑘 ln𝑊 = 𝑁𝑘 ln𝑁 − 𝑘o𝑛Z ln 𝑛ZZ .																																																 
It is a maximum if it vanishes under variation in the 𝑛Z’s as constrained by (8). Introducing 
the usual Lagrange undetermined multipliers 𝛼, 𝛽 (one for each constraint):  𝛿 ln𝑊Å = −o(ln 𝑛ÆZ + 1 + 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝜀)Z 𝛿𝑛Z = 0																								 
where now the variations 𝛿𝑛Z can be treated as independent, it follows:  ln 𝑛ÆZ + 1 + 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝜀 = 0.																																																																 
On rearranging we obtain (absorbing 𝛼 into a normalisation constant 𝐴):  									𝑛ÆZ = 𝐴𝑒®¯ZÇ																																																																																							(29) 
where 𝐴 and 𝛽 are to be determined from the constraints (8) and the fundamental relation 
(23) (replacing U by E). Every single step in this derivation had been given by Boltzmann, 
writing down formulae identical to the above in his memoire, more than three decades before, 
up to notational variations. Eq.(29) is known as the ‘Boltzmann probability distribution’.  
Supposing now, as Boltzmann did not, that the size of the unit 𝜀 has a physical meaning and 
that the continuum limit should not be taken. Then the average energy of the objects is 									𝑈 = ∑ 𝑘𝜀𝑛ÆZZ∑ 𝑛ÆZZ = 𝜀𝑒¯Ç − 1		.																																																														(30) 
If instead the continuum limit is taken, we obtain: 									𝑈 = ∫ 𝜖𝑒®¯É𝑑𝜖∫ 𝑒®¯É𝑑𝜖 = 1𝛽.																																																																									(31) 
As usual, in both cases, 𝛽 is identified with 1/𝑘𝑇 from the fundamental relation Eq.(23).   
Suppose now that the objects are (distinguishable) Planckian resonators with natural 
frequency 𝑣, and that the energy unit is 𝜀 = ℎ𝑣. With these substitutions in (30), and from the 
resonator equation (21), the Planck distribution follows immediately. Working from the 
continuum limit (31) instead we obtain the Rayleigh-Jeans distribution: 𝜌(𝑣, 𝑇) = 8𝜋𝑣j𝑐" 𝑘𝑇	.																																																																													 
The latter follows even more simply from the equipartition theorem applied to the normal 
modes of the Jeans cube, and from the Jeans number Eq.(26). As a general result, of course, 
it would be disastrous: the energy of radiation in any finite volume, at non-zero temperature, 
would be infinite, for the distribution diverges with frequency (the ‘ultra-violet catastrophe’ 
as Ehrenfest memorably called it). It is the discretisation of the energy of the resonators that 
makes the difference: at high frequencies, for  ℎ𝑣 ≫ 𝑘𝑇,  resonators will rarely or never be 
excited by random motions at thermal energies of order 𝑘𝑇, for the energy transfers needed 
will rarely or never be so large.  
The result was rigorous (with the imprimatur of both Lorentz and Poincaré), and proved that 
discretisation of the energy was essential to the quantum theory of material oscillators. The 
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implications transcended the black body radiation formula, and following Bohr’s model of 
the atom, led directly to the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantisation rules. It was the locomotive 
driving to Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, but on the indistinguishability concept it had 
nothing to say. And there for more than a decade the matter lay.   
 
4. Light Quanta 
4.1 Natanson 
Ladislas Natanson, Professor of theoretical physics at the University of Cracow, had a long 
and distinguished career, but it is for his essay ‘On the statistical theory of radiation’ 
published in 1911 that he has been thought important by historians. It is widely accredited to 
be the first significant writing on the concept of quantum indistinguishability,37 so it deserves 
special consideration. Although it seems it went unremarked, it may have been read. It was 
certainly accessible, as published in English (in two journals) and in German.  
It began with the words:  
It is to Planck that we owe the fundamental conception on which the theory in its 
present state essentially depends. As is well known, Planck supposes that energy is 
not divisible without limit, but is constituted of an aggregate of discrete elements or 
units; and that the ultimate particles of which matter consists are capable only of 
absorbing, containing and emitting amounts of energy which are multiples of these 
finite and determinate units.  
Natanson took Planck’s early talk of energy elements literally, as a plurality of units 𝜀 
(Natanson used the symbol 𝑒). They were to be distributed over these ‘ultimate particles of 
which matter consists’ – what he went he went on to call ‘independent material entities’ (and 
then ‘elementary receptacles’; ‘independent’ was not used again). A state distribution is now 
an assignment of energy elements to receptacles. These he initially proposed to treat in an 
even-handed way:  
When we speak of state-distributions we do not in any sense imply we can identify 
either receptacles or energy-units. To specify a definite state-distribution, we require 
to know the number of elementary receptacles to which any given number of units of 
energy has been allotted; but we are not bound to have any control over the 
receptacles taken individually, nor to be able to detect each energy-unit and to trace it 
through its course. The circumstances of the problem are quite different if we suppose 
that the elementary receptacles of which our problem consists are distinguishable; 
that we can lay hold of each receptacle and ascertain its identity.’ (p.135)  
In that case, we should use Boltzmann’s term ‘complexions’, and indeed count them as 
equiprobable – but only so long as the energy-units are not distinguishable:  
In speaking as above of complexions, it is of course implied that we are capable of 
dealing with the individual receptacles; but the elements or units of energy are all 
regarded as being undistinguishably alike.’ (p.136).  
 
37 Hund suggests Natanson’s method ‘is precisely that later used by Bose’ (Hund 1974 p.51). Kastler (1983) and 
Bergia (1987) concur with Hund and are puzzled his paper received so little notice. According to Darrigol (1991 
p.239), Natanson was the first to introduce the concept of indistinguishable particles in what he calls the 
‘molecular’ approach to probability (in contrast to Gibbs’ ‘holistic’ approach).  
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As Natanson goes on to argue, if the energy-units were distinguishable, the relevant 
microstates would be quite different; and if the latter were equiprobable, the former could not 
be: nature must decide. And indeed, nature has already chosen: ‘and it may be recalled here 
that in every known demonstration of Planck’s formula the same [indistinguishable] principle 
is employed’.38  
Was Natanson right to say this? It is true that all the then-known derivations could be 
interpreted in terms of indistinguishable energy-units, or very like, and as we have seen, and 
as Natanson rightly insists, invariance of microstates under permutations of energy-units 
among receptacles (Planckian resonators, or modes of the Jeans cube) is then required. But 
by 1911 neither Planck, nor, at that time, virtually anyone (including Einstein) wished to 
interpret the energy distribution over resonators in terms of an assignment of energy-units 
over receptacles, be they resonators or modes of the electromagnetic field. Debye chose not 
to; Planck preferred, where possible, not to talk about radiation at all. On the Solvay model, 
resonators were assigned energy-grades, not energy-units. And those who took light quanta 
seriously, most notably Einstein and Ehrenfest, thought stronger arguments were needed to 
infer a particle structure to radiation, arguments that appeared to be restricted to the Wien 
regime. On all these points Natanson was silent. 
What, at bottom, was Natanson’s conception of indistinguishables? He nowhere explicitly 
identified his energy-units as light quanta. They were abstract from the beginning (he did not 
so much as mention the concept of frequency). That would seem to suggest they must have 
exactly the same energy (and since they have no other attributes, they must be exactly 
similar) – the Planck notion.  His talk of ‘laying hold of’ and ‘detection’, on the other hand, 
suggests the epistemic notion. At any rate, it explicitly rules out entities that can be ‘traced 
through their course’, so they cannot possibly have trajectories. It is not the Gibbs concept.  
Natanson introduced needed clarity. He set out some of the combinatorial expressions of 
§2.5, including the identity of (18) and (19) (but so had Boltzmann). He gave a derivation, 
not of the Planck distribution, but of the Boltzmann probability distribution, Eq.(29) –
precisely following Boltzmann! His subsequent discussion of the difference between systems 
‘abundantly bestowed’ with energy-units, and those ‘poorly endowed’, missing as he did the 
coarse-graining into frequency intervals, was flawed. He made no comment on statistical 
independence, or the lack of it. There may be no great puzzle here as to why his essay 
received so little commentary.39  
Yet it may well have prompted the complaint against those who took ‘energy elements’ 
seriously, made by Ehrenfest and Kamerlingh-Onnes the following year, as appended to a 
note on the derivation of the Boltzmann binomial Eq.(18) (the symbol-sequence argument). 
They did not mention Natanson by name, but they surely had him in mind when they said: 
Planck does not deal with really mutually free quanta 𝜀, the resolution of the multiples 
of 𝜀 into separate elements 𝜀,  which is essential in his [original] method, and the 
introduction of these separate elements have to be taken ‘cum grano salis’; it is simply 
a formal device entirely analogous to our permutations of the elements [symbols] 𝜀 or 
0 [in the symbol-sequence argument]. The real object which is counted remains the 
number of all the different distributions of N resonators over the energy-grades 0, 𝜀, 2𝜀, with a given total energy 𝑃𝜀. ….. Planck’s formal device (distribution of P energy 
 
38 (Ibid p.139). Natanson continued ‘The moment we suppose that individual energy-units are not altogether 
beyond our power of discerning them, the rule laid down by Planck, and adopted by nearly all writers who have 
treated of the subject, ceases to be applicable.’ (ibid p.139). 
39See Bergia (1987 p.234-5) for further discussion.   
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elements 𝜀 over N resonators) cannot be interpreted in the sense of Einstein’s light-
quanta (1912 p.357, emphasis original). 
The key phrase is ‘really mutually free quanta’. Planck’s energy elements, whatever they 
were, could not be mutually free, except in a special regime. It is time to see why.  
 
4.2 Einstein’s Light Quantum Argument 
Einstein’s 1905 argument for a particulate structure to radiation is a thing of beauty, but his 
wording in stating his conclusion was unfortunate:   
Monochromatic radiation of low density (within the range of validity of Wien’s 
radiation formula) behaves thermodynamically as if it consisted of mutually 
independent energy quanta of magnitude ℎ𝑣. 
There is no mention of locality, although this too was used in deriving his fluctuation formula 
– and was in fact the more essential assumption. As we shall see, despite the particular kind 
of mutual dependencies involved using the generic phase, the same fluctuation formula 
follows. Einstein’s argument does not discriminate between the generic and the specific 
phase.  
There are a number of similarities to Planck’s derivation of his black-body formula, as 
outlined in §3.1. Like Planck, Einstein inferred the equilibrium entropy of radiation from the 
spectral density formula, and like Planck, he interpreted this entropy in terms of probabilities. 
The difference was that Einstein worked from the Wien distribution, Eq.(22), restricting 
attention to the high-frequency, low-temperature regime. Another difference is that he did not 
seek to justify the spectral law (he already knew the Wien distribution held only in this 
regime); he sought rather to learn from it. He began his paper with the observation that the 
equipartition theorem, applied to the classical electromagnetic field, gave the right behaviour 
at long wavelengths and high temperatures (what he called ‘high energy densities’, in view of 
Stefan’s law), but not at high frequencies and low temperatures; he wanted to know why 
radiation in the Wien regime behaved so differently.  
Einstein’s starting point was the fundamental relation (23), but written in terms of densities, 
what he called ‘the law of black bodies’: 𝑑𝜑𝑑𝜌´µq¶·wm = 1𝑇	.																																																																																 
From the Wien distribution law (22), the right-hand side can be written as a function of 𝜌; on 
integrating: 									𝜑 = − 𝜌𝛽𝑣 £ln 𝜌𝛼𝑣" − 1¤.																																																																				(32) 
Planck had found this equation in 1898 in exactly the same way; he used the same method to 
derive Eq.(24) from the Planck distribution two years later. Einstein’s originality lay in what 
came next.  
Einstein supposed that the radiation field, like a gas, may be subject to fluctuations. 
Specifically, he considered a fluctuation whereby the energy 𝐸 of radiation initially in spatial 
volume 𝑉. is subsequently located in a sub-volume 𝑉. The energy density thus changes from 
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𝜌 = 𝐸/𝑉. to 𝜌′ = 𝐸/𝑉 and with it the entropy density 𝜑. From Eq.(32) the initial entropy 
is:40 𝑆. = 𝜑𝑉. = − 𝐸𝛽𝑣 ;ln 𝐸𝛼𝑣"𝑉.	 − 1<																																																 
and after the fluctuation to volume V it is: 𝑆 = 𝜑Ë𝑉 = − 𝐸𝛽𝑣 ;ln 𝐸𝛼𝑣"𝑉	 − 1<.																																																		 
The difference is: 𝑆 − 𝑆. = 𝐸𝛽𝑣 ln 𝑉𝑉. = 	𝑘 ln ;𝑉𝑉.<Ì/Z¯° .																																										 
But this has the same dependence on the two volumes as obtained for an ideal gas of N 
particles, Eq.(1), if only the exponent of the ratio of volumes can be interpreted as the number 
of particles – if only radiation consisted of ‘independent, movable points’. In this way he 
deduced:  𝑁 = 𝐸𝑘𝛽𝑣																																																																																															 
or, in Planck’s notation, if 𝑁 = 𝐸/ℎ𝑣. That is, if light were made up of mutually 
independent, moveable points, of number 𝐸/ℎ𝑣, then the fluctuation formula would be in 
accordance with that following from the Wien distribution. Locality is essential to the 
argument.41   
But is mutual independence? If the volume measure on phase space is of the form 𝑊 ∝ 𝑉9, 
the relative probability of the fluctuation is, according to Einstein, the ratio 							𝑊𝑊. = ;𝑉𝑉.<9 .																																																																																								(33) 
This assumes the specific phase. But the ratio using Gibbs’ generic phase is given by the 
same expression:  𝑊c𝑊c. = ;𝑉𝑉.<9																																																																																									 
despite the fact that 𝑊c ∝ 𝑉9/𝑁! cannot be factorised.  
Evidently we should read Einstein as requiring mutual independence – the factorisation 
condition – as holding only of the relative probabilities, so that only ratios in the probabilities 
need factorise. And so they do: each particle, using the Gibbs phase, has a relative probability 𝑉/𝑉. of being found in 𝑉 if initially in 𝑉., and the total relative probability of all N particles 
initially in V being subsequently found in 𝑉., is the product of the relative probabilities for 
each of them, the same for the generic as for the specific phase. However, there are other 
fluctuations possible which do not factorise in this way – most notably, as in the Gibbs 
 
40 This step implicitly assumes extensivity of the entropy, as Einstein must have realised.  
41 Whether the ‘movable points’ must really be points will depend, presumably, on the precision with which the 
probability of the fluctuation is defined (perhaps only in the limit 𝑣 → ∞). Dorling (1971) argues the particles 
must be point-like (recently endorsed by Norton (2006)). 
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paradox.  
Thus, consider the gas in volume 𝑉. as consisting of two gases, of particle number 𝑁$ and 𝑁&, each initially in volume 𝑉.; each of which undergoes a fluctuation, the one resulting in 
the 𝑁$  particles being localised in A, a sub-volume of 𝑉. with volume  𝑉$, and the other 
resulting in the localisation of the 𝑁& particles in the disjoint region B, of volume 𝑉&. If the 
two fluctuations are mutually independent, the relative probability of the two taken jointly is 
the product of the relative probabilities of each fluctuation taken independently, i.e. it is the 
product:																				𝑉$9R/𝑁$!𝑉.9R/𝑁$! 	 ∙ 	𝑉&9T/𝑁&!𝑉.9T/𝑁&! = ;𝑉$𝑉.<9R ∙ ;𝑉&𝑉.<9T .																																										(34)			 
But taken jointly, the relative joint probability is the ratio of the joint final probability to the 
joint initial probability:            																		𝑉$9R/𝑁$! ∙ 𝑉&9T/𝑁&!𝑉.9/𝑁! .																																																																																	(35) 
The two are not the same, and (35) does not factorise, no more than does (7). Eq.(34) is the 
same as using the specific phase, and leads to the Gibbs paradox, as we have seen. When the 
densities of particles are the same, 𝑁$/𝑉$ = 𝑁&/𝑉& = 𝑁/𝑉, the joint fluctuation is just the 
time inverse of the mixing process in the Gibbs set-up; on the generic phase, it yields no 
change in entropy. No more does the entropy density derived from the Wien distribution by 
(32) change for the joint fluctuation, for the joint energy and number density before and after 
are the same.  
Whether probabilities or relative probabilities, if calculated by the generic phase, they do not 
factorise. Collections of indistinguishable particles in Gibbs’ sense are not mutually 
independent of each other, in Einstein’s sense. Of course that means that collections of 
photons are not mutually independent of each other, either, in Einstein’s sense, not even in 
the Wien regime; for the Wien regime just is the classical limit of a gas of photons, which 
just is Gibbs generic phase, by Eq.(11).  
What then is showing up away from the Wien regime, for indistinguishable particles, if not 
the failure of statistical independence? But failure come in degrees: away from the Wien 
regime, Eq.(11) fails as well as factorizability. Statistical dependencies, which hitherto were 
showing up only for collections of particles, now show up at the level of individual particles. 
The probability of an already occupied state is greater than that calculated using the specific 
phase, if every state distribution is equiprobable, on the generic phase.  
Einstein had a more intuitive way of putting it. Away from the Wien regime, wavelike 
behaviour begins to show. After all, it was in the long wavelength, high temperature regime 
that classical electromagnetic waves behaved thermally as they should, obeying the 
equipartition theorem. He was further buttressed in this view by a second fluctuation formula 
for radiation, that he obtained in 1909, this time concerning the mean square deviation in 
energy in a given volume. It consisted in the sum of two terms, one characteristic of a gas of 
particles, the other of classical radiation. It was natural for Einstein, and the handful of others 
prepared to take the light quantum heuristic seriously, to associate the wave picture with the 
Rayleigh-Jeans regime, and the particle picture to the Wien. They supposed that the wavelike 
behaviour took place when light quanta were collected together in groups, in the same 
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elementary cells of the harmonic oscillator (this at about the time of the Bohr-Sommerfeld 
quantisation conditions), or perhaps were guided by waves, explaining also their mutual 
dependences. For this to happen, light quanta had to be exactly the same, the Planck notion of 
indistinguishability.42 But that would seem to be wrong-headed if collections of particles 
already fail to be mutually independent of each other in the Wien regime, even when particles 
are rarely if ever found in the same elementary cells.  
What, in light of this, are we to think of the complaint of Ehrenfest and Kamerlingh-Onnes? 
Is it true that Planck’s energy elements could not be thought of as Einstein’s light quanta, 
away from the Wien regime? But as just remarked, Einstein’s fluctuation probability should 
then be defined by ratios of symmetric Boltzmann binomials (in the form of Eq.(27)): 													(𝑁 + 𝑉)!	𝑁! 𝑉! / (𝑁 + 𝑉.)!𝑁! 𝑉.! .																																																																																(36) 
This is just the expression Einstein would have deduced, with the same exponent 𝑁 = 𝐸/ℎ𝑣, 
from the difference in entropy before and after the fluctuation, had he started from Planck’s 
distribution rather than Wien’s.43 Ehrenfest and Kamerlingh-Onnes came within a 
hairsbreadth of this observation, for they wrote down precisely the expression (36), and did 
so just in order to draw the contrast with (33), as given by Einstein for the Wien regime.  
Alas, they made  no more of it. 
 
5. The Bose-Einstein gas 
5.1 Bose’s intervention 
There was a good reason why Einstein never took Debye’s model seriously, and that is 
because of its dependence on Maxwell’s classical field theory. Debye had thought it a 
mistake to rely on Lorentz’s electrodynamics, as unknown molecular forces appeared to be in 
play, and for this reason he eschewed use of Planck’s resonator equation. He did without it by 
replacing resonators by modes of cavity radiation, using the Jeans number, and evoking his 
‘elementary quantum hypothesis’. Einstein agreed with Debye that Planck’s resonator 
equation could not be trusted, but he thought the same of Jeans’ calculation (and, one might 
add, of Debye’s quantum hypothesis). And there, more or less, Einstein let the matter lie.  
The huge jolt to Einstein’s thinking, and what prompted his paper ‘The Quantum Theory of 
the Ideal Monatomic Gas’ presented on 10th July 1924 to the Prussian Academy of Science in 
Berlin, was a letter from a complete outsider, a Mr Satyendra Bose, of the University of 
Dacca, East Bengal, then 30 years old. He asked for Einstein’s assistance in publishing a 
short paper, written in English, six pages in length. Einstein translated it himself and had it 
published in Zeitschrift fur Physik, and within a week had submitted his own paper.  
 
42 Beginning with the attempts to derive Planck’s formula by Wolfke (with Einstein’s encouragement – Wolfke 
was a privatdozent at Zurich in Einstein’s Zurich years), and later by Ioffe, Bothe, Ishiwara, and de Broglie. See 
Darrigol (1991 p.257-60). These efforts were largely driven by a power-series expansion of the Planck 
distribution in powers of exp	(−ℎ𝑣/𝑘𝑇), whereupon it takes the form of a sum of distributions similar to 
Wien’s. I am unconvinced that this line of inquiry contains more than formal comparisons. 
43In place of Eq.(24), write S as a function of 𝜌. Einstein in 1909 gave what he called a ‘similar’ treatment to 
that of 1905 using the Planck distribution, rather than Wien’s, but went on to derive the mean square fluctuation 
of the energy already remarked on; a rather different quantity.   
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Bose’s new idea was mathematically simple, and on a superficial evaluation it was 
conceptually straightforward: it was to quantise a system by applying the same method of 
dividing up the one-particle phase space of a system into elementary cells of volume ℎ", as 
had been successfully applied to the simple-harmonic oscillator and later by Bohr and 
Sommerfeld to multiply-periodic systems. In effect, it was to let 𝜏 = ℎ" in (4) – it could not 
have been simpler. But on another level it was completely transformative: Bose had 
calculated the Jeans number as the number of elementary cells in a range of momentum and 
spatial volume of a one-particle phase space, when the system in question was the light 
quantum; for the first time the light quantum was conceived of as a particle with its own 
state-space. From this point on we shall use the term ‘photon’, as it was soon to be called.  
It was immediately obvious to Einstein how to apply the same calculation, and obtain the 
analogue of the Jeans number, for free non-relativistic particles with mass. He fully 
acknowledged his debt to Bose in the introduction to his own paper, submitted the following 
week, with the words: 
The path to be taken below, following Bose, is to be described thus: The phase space 
of an elementary structure (here of a monatomic molecule) is divided, with reference 
to a given (three dimensional) volume into “cells” of extension ℎ". If many 
elementary structures are present, then their (microscopic) distribution as regards 
thermodynamics is characterised by the ways and means by which the elementary 
entities are distributed across these cells. The “probability” of a macroscopically 
defined state (in Plank’s sense) is equal to the number of different microscopic states 
by which the macroscopic state can be thought to be realised. The entropy of the 
macroscopic state, and therefore the statistical and thermodynamical behaviour of the 
system, is then determined by Boltzmann’s principle. (p.276). 
The latter part of Bose’s method, as recounted by Einstein, was reasonably familiar (although 
it involved a certain inversion of the roles of particles and states); it was the first part that was 
revolutionary. Indeed, in calculating the Jeans number, or what played the role of the Jeans 
number in the derivation of the black-body formula, in terms of the number of elementary 
cells in the one-particle state space of the photon, Bose had shown how the one-particle states 
of the photon could be set up in 1:1 correspondence with the normal modes of the Jeans cube. 
It was the one-particle state space of the photon, or isomorphic to it. That is, its state space, 
for finite volume and fixed frequency range, was (isomorphic to) a finite dimensional vector 
space. It is a vector space because modes of the radiation field may be superposed. 
Events were too fast-moving to know if either Bose, or Einstein, could properly assimilate 
this idea, or even grasp it; but Schrödinger, by the spring of 1926, surely did, as did Dirac by 
August that year. But Einstein may have glimpsed it already in the summer of 1924, filtered 
through de Broglie’s ideas, whose PhD thesis had been sent to him by his friend Paul 
Langevin in Paris. De Broglie had shown how a wave could be associated with a material 
particle; we shall say more of his influence shortly.  
There is the other important aspect of Bose’s derivation of the black-body formula: at no 
point did it so much as hint at the fact that photons, although non-interacting, could not 
possibly be mutually independent. As in the Solvay model, the Boltzmann binomial did not 
appear at all, and instead there was only a permutability. Yet the objects in question were 
(indistinguishable) light quanta, not (distinguishable) Planckian resonators.  Nor did Einstein 
 29 
remark on it, neither in his own submission some ten days later, nor in correspondence with 
Ehrenfest  at about the same time; and this despite the fact that what had obstructed the 
interpretation of thermal radiation in terms of light quanta for almost two decades was the 
failure of mutual independence in the Rayleigh-Jeans regime. Bose had somehow broken 
through this difficulty.  
He did so through an inversion of the role of particles and states. In place of state 
distributions, his macrostates specified the number of (distinguishable) elementary cells 
assigned 𝑘 (indistinguishable) particles. His microstates, accordingly, did not further specify 
which particles are assigned to which cell, but rather, for each 𝑘, which cells are assigned 𝑘 
particles. Historians have widely reported this move as a kind of mistake, and Bose’s 
discovery the product of an accidental or serendipitous confusion.45 It is true that Bose did 
not comment on the matter.  But it is particularly natural following Debye’s derivation of 
Planck’s formula (which we know Bose studied), that had replaced Planck’s resonators by 
field modes: if those modes are one-particle states of the photon, then modes of the 
electromagnetic field, the objects in Debye’s treatment that are assigned energy quanta, are 
turned into one-particle states, that are assigned photons. We have noted the duality operating 
at the level of the arithmetical identities as well. Einstein himself did not remark on this 
aspect of Bose’s treatment in his summary, just quoted, attributing the concept of macrostate 
in play to Planck. ‘Mistake’ is the wrong word for it. But there is no doubt that it concealed 
the statistical dependence of light quanta, just as effectively as had the Solvay model. It may 
have seemed that light quanta could be treated as statistically independent after all, even in 
the Rayleigh-Jeans regime, especially for those convinced by Einstein in 1905 (among them, 
we must assume, Einstein) that they were mutually independent in the Wien regime.  
There is still more to the intrigue. Consider an elementary region 𝑉 × [𝑝, 𝑝 + ∆𝑝], indexed 
by s. Bose’s ‘inversion’ consisted in replacing occupation numbers 𝑛Z  (particle numbers 
assigned state k) by what are called ‘occupancy numbers’,  integers 𝑝Z  specifying the number 
of one-partcle states assigned k particles. Macrostates are now complete sets of occupancy 
numbers 𝒑𝒔 = {𝑝., 𝑝^, . . , }.  A microstate for Bose specified, of each cell, the number of 
photons. There are exactly 														𝑊c = 𝑧!𝑝.! 𝑝^! …																																																																																											(37) 
distinct microstates for each macrostate, in Bose’s sense of these terms (compare Eq.(17); 
distinguishable cells are replacing distinguishable particles). He did not mention that this is 
the correct count of microstates only if interchange of photons does not lead to a new 
microstate, and that it connects with probabilities only if these microstates are equiprobable. 
Eq.(37) is the number of microstates for the macrostate 𝒑 of a single elementary region s. 
The total number 𝑊c  for all elementary regions is the product of the numbers (37) for all 
regions 𝑠. (Fairly obviously, there is no further multiplicity, corresponding to how the cells 
are divided up into groups of 𝑧 cells for each elementary region s.) The result is: 
 
45 A charge led by Delbruck (1980), followed by Pais (1982) and Darrigol (1991). According to Mehra and 
Rechenberg (1982 p.567), the change was ‘slight’ and ‘consistent with the spirit of probability theory’. Bach 
(1990) detects similar shifts in Boltzmann’s early combinatorics. Bose was later to say that he was unaware of 
doing anything out of the ordinary (as recorded by Merha and Rechenberg 1982).  
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																𝑊c = 𝑊c = 𝑧!𝑝.! 𝑝^! … 																																																															(38) 
where:  												o𝑝Z = 𝑧,Z 	oo𝑘𝜀𝑝ZZ = 𝐸.																																																														(39) 
The variational problem proposed by Bose was to maximise (38) on variation of the 𝑝Z	‘s  
subject to the constraints (39). This introduces two Lagrange undetermined multipliers in the 
way we know and love, the first the normalisation, the second the temperature, with the 
result:  												?̅?Z = 𝐴𝑒®¯ZÇ                                                                                  (40)          
with 𝛽 identified as 1/𝑘𝑇. From Bose’s calculation of the number of elementary cells 𝑧 
(equal to the Jeans number) the Planck distribution follows immediately.  
I have said this follows Debye’s method, replacing ‘normal modes’ by ‘elementary cells’; but 
then why not write down the quantities 													𝑊 = (𝑧 + 𝑝)!𝑧! 𝑝! 																																																																																										(41) 
rather than the permutabilties in (37)? The answer is that Debye had in effect taken a short-
cut.  On maximising (38), the volume of the resultant equilibrium distribution: 𝑊Å = 𝑧!?̅?.! ?̅?^! …																																																																																								 
with the equilibrium energy  o𝑘𝜀?̅?ZZ = 𝐸Æ																																																																																							 
occupies almost the entire available phase space volume. The latter, the total number of 
microstates in Bose’s sense, is: 														 o 𝑧!𝑝.! 𝑝^! … 		=	𝒑;	∑ Ôxx qÕ ,			∑ ZÔx 	qÔx 	 (𝑧 + 𝑝 − 1)!(𝑧 − 1)! 𝑝! 																														(42) 
where 𝑝 = 𝐸Æ/𝜀. It is the same arithmetical identity of (18) with (19) written down (without 
proof) by Boltzmann more than four decades earlier. If we remove reference to s, it is even 
the same notation. 46 The equilibrium state dominates the sum, so Debye’s use of (42) (or, 
equivalently, (41)) for 𝑊 in the expression to be maximized was bound to yield the same 
equilibrium entropy.  
It is the final piece of the jig-saw. It only remains to step back to see the big picture.  
 
 
46 We know Bose read Boltzmann (1877) and Debye (1910b). Mehra and Rechenberg agree that he essentially 
followed Debye (1982 p.565). Bergia’s objection (1987 p.244) that if so, he should have used Eq.(42), has just 
been cleared up. Bose also sent his second paper to Einstein, a few days after his first, in which Eq.(28) figured 
prominently, with explicit reference to Debye.  
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5.2 Quantum Theory of the Ideal Monatomic Gas 
It took two steps back. The first was to understand that Bose’s ideas applied just as much to 
non-relativistic particles as to light quanta, and to particles with a conserved mass (so to 
particles that clearly changed their states over time). The second was to see that the new 
statistics built in the statistical dependencies evident for light quanta in the Rayleigh-Jeans 
regime. Both steps were made by Einstein, the first almost immediately (in his first paper on 
gas theory, submitted ten days after receiving Bose’s manuscript), the second some six 
months later.  
Bose had reasoned that the elementary region 𝑉 × [𝑝, 𝑝 + ∆𝑝], of volume 𝑉4𝜋𝑝j∆𝑝, 
degenerate with respect to the energy, should be divided into elementary cells of size ℎ". The 
number of cells is then 																	𝑧 = 4𝜋𝑉ℎ" 𝑝j∆𝑝.																																																																																					(43)		 
In the case of light quanta, as was by 1924 well-known from Compton’s treatment of X-ray 
scattering (but that had figured in Einstein’s writings much earlier): 																	𝜀j = 𝑝j𝑐j = (ℎ𝑣)j.																																																																																(44) 
Substituting for 𝑝j∆𝑝 in (43), the result is the Jeans number, Eq.(26), save for a factor of 
two. In his published paper, this factor was justified by appeal to the two states of 
polarisation of light.47 The rest of the derivation was as just outlined, Eqs.(37)-(40).  
Einstein applied exactly the same procedure to non-relativistic material particles, making the 
two obvious needed changes. The first is the replacement of (44) by the non-relativistic 
energy:  𝜀 = 𝑝j2𝑚.																																																																																																 
 Substituting in (43) as before, but expressed in terms of an energy width ∆𝜀 rather than 
frequency ∆𝑣, Einstein obtained: 𝑧 = 2𝜋ℎ" 𝑉×𝜀∆𝜀.																																																																													 
The second is that mass should be conserved, or equivalently (in non-relativistic physics) 
particle number should be conserved. There is therefore a new constraint in addition to (39): oo𝑘𝑝ZZ = 𝑁.																																																																																	 
The calculation of the equilibrium state then proceeded as with Bose’s derivation. The rest, as 
they say, is history: a new equilibrium state for matter, a new equation of state, and a new 
phase of matter, the Bose-Einstein condensate.  
 
47 Pais (1986 p.283)) recounts that Bose’s English manuscript (subsequently lost) justified the factor two on the 
hypothesis that light quanta have unit angular momentum that could take only two orthogonal orientations (a 
version of events supported by Einstein’s letter to Bose, 2 July 1924, in Buchwald et al (2015 p.266)). Alas, its 
translator provided a different rational, referring to the classical concept of polarisation instead. 
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The introduction of mass was important to a wealth of new physics, but it matters to our story 
too, because unlike light quanta, it was not in doubt that non-relativistic particles with mass 
persisted through change – that they possessed, at least in a general sense, trajectories. They 
also possessed a clear state-independent property, preserved in time, namely mass. Plausibly 
then light quanta did too. It is telling that the term ‘photon’ was introduced on the assumption 
that it possessed a state-independent property, namely spin – and, as a matter of record, under 
the assumption that photon number was conserved.48 ‘Mass zero’ was, in due course, to 
become a state-independent property.49   
The second step back was to connect to Debye’s formulae, and it was made in Einstein’s 
second paper on gas theory, submitted in December 1924. He called Bose’s method ‘Method 
(a)’ writing down without further comment the volume of an elementary region with 𝑧 cells 
as: 𝑊c = (𝑧 + 𝑛 − 1)!(𝑧 − 1)! 𝑛! .																																																																																 
and for the total number of microstates the product of these Boltzmann binomials over s, 
Eq.(15), yielding the entropy   																				𝑆d =o{(𝑛 + 𝑧) ln(𝑛 + 𝑧) − 𝑛 ln 𝑛 − 𝑧 ln 𝑧} .																													(45) 
Einstein immediately concluded: 
It is easily recognised that by this calculation approach the distribution of molecules 
over the cells is not treated as statistically independent. This is because the cases, here 
called ‘complexions’, would not be regarded of equal probability according to the 
hypothesis of an independent distribution of the individual molecules among the cells. 
For really statistically independent molecules, the counting of these ‘complexions’ of 
different probabilities would not yield the entropy correctly.  
Indeed, away from the limit 𝑧 ≫ 𝑛, probabilities are affected even at the level of individual 
molecules. Thus for 𝑧 = 𝑛 = 2, the probability of a single molecule in each cell is one-third 
(as for the only two other microstates, where both are in the same one-particle cell); whereas 
if the interchange of particles defines a new microstate, it is one-half, assuming microstates 
are equiprobable. The latter point is the same as Natanson’s critique. 
In contrast, ‘Method (b)’ is defined ‘according to the hypothesis of the statistical 
independence of the molecules’, with volume measure (12): 𝑊 = 𝑧	w																																																																																											 
and for the total number of microstates for all the elementary regions Eq.(14): 
 
48 Both were required by G. N. Lewis in 1926, when he coined the term ‘photon’. It was moreover an property 
invariant under Lorentz transformations (‘all photons are alike in one property which has the dimensions of 
action or of angular momentum, and is invariant to a relativity transformation’ (Lewis 1926 p.874)). 
49 As prefigured in the abstract of Einstein’s third and final paper on gas theory, ‘This theory seems legitimate 
when one starts from the conviction that a light quantum (disregarding its polarisation property) differs from a 
monatomic molecule essentially only in that the quantum’s mass if vanishingly small’ (Buchwald et al, p.418).  
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𝑊 = 𝑁!𝑛^!…𝑛!…𝑊																																																									 										 
including the overall permutability for exchanges of particles between different elementary 
regions. The entropy is:  										𝑆 = 𝑘𝑁 ln𝑁 +𝑘o{(𝑛 ln 𝑧 − 𝑛 ln 𝑛)	} .																																	(46) 
Einstein had almost the full picture; only absent was the limiting equality Eq.(11), for 𝑧 ≫𝑛 -- given which it would have been obvious that  												𝑊c ≈ 𝑊𝑁!	,																																																																																																(47)		 
the equation written down by Tetrode in 1914, in a notation that made clear his debt to Gibbs, 
and that drew published criticism from Lorentz.   
Einstein did not just omit this observation; he missed it. For commenting on the entropy (46), 
obtained using Method (b), he said of the leading term 𝑁 ln𝑁: 
When comparing the entropies of different macroscopic states of the same gas, this 
term plays the role of an inconsequential constant that we can leave out. We must 
leave it out if -- as is customary in thermodynamics -- we want to achieve that the 
entropy be proportional to the number of molecules of a given inner state of the gas. 
…One usually tends to justify this omission of the factor N! in W for gases by 
regarding complexions arising from the mere exchange of molecules of the same kind 
as not different and, therefore, as being counted only once. (p.375). 
But that is precisely the assumption of the new statistics, Bose’s method, as would have been 
obvious from (47). Had Einstein seen that division by 𝑁! follows as the dilute limit of the 
new statistics, using Bose’s method, he would have said so.50 That Method (b), corrected by 
division by 𝑁!, is the dilute limit of Method (a), likewise went unmentioned.  
Were the connection clear, Einstein would also have noted it in light of Nernst’s theorem, the 
so-called third law of thermodynamics: the requirement that the entropy of a gas goes to zero 
with the absolute temperature. If a simple subtraction of the term 𝑘𝑁 ln𝑁 is made from (46), 
Einstein noted, the resulting entropy function no longer satisfies the third law. At absolute 
zero, all particles will be in the first quantum state:  𝑛 = 0 for 𝑠 ≠ 1																																																																															               																	𝑛^ = 𝑁                                                                                             (48) 𝑧^ = 1.																																																																																																 
But the corrected entropy function is then −𝑘𝑁 ln𝑁, rather than zero. As Einstein observed, 
in the new gas theory, using Method (b), the choice between extensivity and the Nernst 
theorem is exclusive: you cannot have both. But you have both for the entropy 𝑆d.  (How so, 
in light of Eq.(11), when the latter yields the ‘corrected’ entropy function for statistically-
independent particles? – because Eq.(48) is about as far from the limit 𝑧 ≫ 𝑛 as you can 
 
50 The phrase ‘one usually tends to justify’ suggests the inference is unsound; this, I suggest, is a faint echo of 
Lorentz’s complaint about Tetrode.  
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get. Einstein was silent on this point as well.) Perhaps surprisingly, since he had never before 
allowed the ‘inconsequential constant’ 𝑘𝑁 ln𝑁 to cause him any trouble,51 Einstein 
concluded that the statistical independence of molecules must be given up for the sake of 
extensivity: 
For these reasons I believe that calculational approach (a) must be given preference, 
although the preference for this calculational approach over other approaches cannot 
be proven a priori. This result, for its part, constitutes a support for the notion of a 
deep essential relationship between radiation and gas, in that the same statistical 
method that leads to Planck’s formula establishes agreement between gas theory and 
the Nernst theorem in its application to ideal gases. (p. 376).  
His volte face on the extensivity puzzle may have been opportunistic. Einstein had, after all, 
already gone into print with his first paper on the gas theory (it was published 20th September 
1924), whereupon arguments subsequently found to be in support of it were naturally 
welcome. But Einstein had in his hands a new quantum theory of the ideal gas, whether on 
the hypothesis of Method (a) or Method (b). Nernst’s theorem required an absolute value of 
the entropy for the ideal gas, and he (rightly) thought it a quantum phenomenon; that surely 
counselled against ad hoc subtractions as a way of solving the 𝑁! puzzle, subtractions that 
might be tolerated in a theory, like classical statistical mechanics, known to be unsafe, but not 
in a new quantum theory of gases. The alternative was Method (a). 
 
5.3 Waves and Particles  
Einstein could not, however, quite bring himself to admit that light behaves as if it is a gas of 
non-interacting light quanta across the entire frequency spectrum (and not just in the Wien 
regime). He preferred, somewhat contrary to his conclusion as just stated, to import into the 
new gas theory the many features that had troubled him for so long concerning black-body 
radiation. Following what was in essence Natanson’s critique, he went on to say:  
Consequently, the formula indirectly expresses a certain hypothesis about an initially 
completely puzzling mutual influence of the molecules that determines just the same 
statistical probability of the cases that are defined here as ‘complexions’ (p.374). 
He drew attention to the other fluctuation formula already referred to, now written for the 
mean square of the difference ∆= 𝑛 − 𝑛Æ. It can be directly derived from the entropy (45), 
so it applied just as much in the new gas theory as in black-body radiation. The result is: ∆jÆÆÆ	= 𝑛Æ + 𝑛Æj𝑧 		.																																																																																		 
Einstein renewed his interpretation of the two terms he had given more than fifteen years 
before: the first as follows for independent molecules, and the second as follows for classical 
radiation, adding: ‘One can interpret it likewise in the case of a gas by suitably assigning to 
the gas a radiation process and calculating its interference fluctuations’ and ‘I shall delve 
deeper into this interpretation because I believe it involves more than a mere analogy’ (p. 
377). 
 
51 See Darrigol (2018 p.30) for Einstein’s few comments on the extensivity puzzle.  
 35 
Enter de Broglie. Einstein continued ‘how a material particle or a system of material 
particles, can be assigned a (scalar) field of waves has been demonstrated by Mr de Broglie in 
a very noteworthy paper’, adding in a footnote that ‘there is a very remarkable geometrical 
interpretation of the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantum rule in this dissertation as well’. He went on 
to sketch de Broglie’s relation between phase and group velocities for a particle of mass m, 
with an associated frequency 𝑚𝑐j = ℎ𝑣. Einstein, in short, pushed for an explanation for the 
failure of statistical independence in terms of a new kind of kinematics.  
Insofar as there was something right about de Broglie’s ideas, there was something right 
about this instinct of Einstein’s. And of course there was something right about de Broglie’s 
ideas, because they did lead Schrödinger to the wave mechanics. Schrödinger had a long-
standing interest in gas theory, and in February 1925 he wrote to Einstein on the failure of 
statistical independence that he had detected in Einstein’s first paper on gas theory. Einstein 
in reply directed him to his (just published) second paper, and thereby to de Broglie’s thesis. 
Schrödinger’s two papers that followed, both on quantum gas theory, immediately proceeded 
the first of his historic papers on wave mechanics.  
This is fast-moving history and it has received plenty of attention by historians,52 but again it 
has a special meaning from the point of view of the concept of indistinguishability. The first 
of Schrödinger’s two papers on quantum statistics continued a debate with Planck on whether 
quantisation should be applied to a gas as a whole (states on 6N-dimension phase space), or 
as a discretisation of one-particle phase space, and on various definitions of the entropy in 
relation to the extensivity of the entropy, which Planck had previously justified on the basis 
of Gibbs’ concept of generic phase. Including as it did commentary on the new Bose-Einstein 
definition of the entropy, this was the closest that anyone came to making the connection 
between quantum statistics and Gibbs’ concept of indistinguishability, prior to Epstein in 
1936, but still Schrödinger did not mention Gibbs by name, did not reference the Principles, 
did not mention the generic phase.53  
The second of Schrödinger’s papers offered an alternative to the Bose-Einstein theory. With 
hindsight it was a retrograde step: it did not so much explain the correlations, as abolish 
them, along with the particles. ‘The real, statistically independent entities’ were now modes 
of a matter field, but it was the state of the entire field that was subject to a discretisation of 
the energy, not the individual modes. But for this difference, it was a near equivalent to 
Debye’s theory of the radiation field, played out in terms of a matter field. Schrödinger did 
not present his new quantized matter field as equivalent to a many-particle theory, as hinted 
at by Einstein, and as established by Dirac in 1927; he sought a rival theory.54  His aim was to 
get rid of the many-particle viewpoint altogether, and with it the violation of statistical 
independence  
Schrödinger’s ‘On Einstein’s gas theory’ was submitted on December 15th 1925. Was it the 
basis for his first paper on wave mechanics, received March 23 1926? Or was it that from 
mid-December he was finally free to consider other aspects of de Broglie’s thesis? – most 
notably the one Einstein had called not just noteworthy, but remarkable: the derivation of the 
 
52 Notable among them Hanle (1977), Mehra and Rechenberg (1987 p.361-65, 367-402), and Darrigol (1986).  
53 Planck responded with an address to the same meeting of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, on 23 July 1925, 
at which Schrödinger’s paper was presented. See Mehra and Rechenberg (1987 9.393-97), Darrigol (1991, 
p.295-98) for further discussion. 
54Indeed, as Schrödinger pointed out, his theory did not contain the Bose-Einstein condensate.  
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Bohr-Sommerfeld quantisation conditions on the basis of an allowed set of stationary waves. 
Recall the title of Schrödinger’s great paper of March 23, ‘Quantisation as an Eigenvalue 
Problem’; it made no connection with quantum statistics.  
Where, when the dust had finally settled, did it all end? Was Einstein right that 
indistinguishability shows a mysterious influence, a correlation, and is it explained in the new 
wave mechanics, or in quantum field theory, and if so in terms of what? There are many 
historians and philosophers of physics who think the answer is yes to both – and that the 
explanation is quantum entanglement. According to them, Einstein was groping his way to a 
mysterious kind of influence that he was eventually to distil in the EPR paradox and in the 
idea of non-separability, that we know is due to entanglement.55 There is a prima facie case to 
conclude that the failure of statistical independence is indeed a quantum phenomenon and 
unlike anything encountered in classical physics. And in that case, the parallel with Gibbs 
notion of indistinguishability as defined by the generic phase cannot possibly be as good as it 
seems.  
Against this, however, there is a growing body of evidence to show that the particular kind of 
entanglement required by symmetrisation is of an essentially trivial kind. Not only is it 
consistent with the existence of well-defined particle trajectories (meaning, orbits of one-
particle states under the unitary evolution, as we shall see in a moment), but it is also 
insufficient to violate any Bell inequality.56 It is, rather, just what is required to ensure factor-
position plays no dynamical role in the theory, or show up on any prediction of the theory, 
provided the Hamiltonian is a symmetric function of particles coordinates (and if it is not: 
then it does not preserve the symmetrisation of the state). In illustration, the partial trace of a 
symmetrised state is the same regardless of the factors traced over, a circumstance that has 
led some otherwise distinguished commenters to conclude that every indistinguishable 
particle is in exactly the same state.  
Symmetrisation says only that particles cannot be assigned states on the basis of factor 
position; they may yet be identified with one-particle states, as Gibbs’ generic phase shows in 
the classical case. 
 
6. Epilogue 
6.1 The Gibbs Paradox Revisited 
Why is it that on the diffusion of two samples of the same gas at the same temperature and 
pressure into one another, the resulting entropy is not the same as the sum for the two taken 
separately – even when the gases are made of non-interacting particles? Why is there an 
entropy increase when only one chamber is occupied, but not when both are occupied, and 
how is it they then cancel? The answer is because when both are occupied, what would 
otherwise be new many-particle states, made available by the removal of the partition, were 
already available; they have already been taken into account. The reason for the lack of 
statistical independence of the two gases, after mixing, is that whilst there are plenty of new 
motions available to the particles – they may now pass from region 𝐴 to region 𝐵, and vice 
versa– but there are no (or almost no) new 𝑁-particle states: there are only new ways of 
 
55 For a persuasive case of this kind, see Howard (1990), endorsed also by Norton (2006).   
56 See Caulton (2020), Ghirardi et al (2002), (2004). 
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leaving and arriving at the very same states. (The qualification ‘almost no’ is needed because 
with the partition removed, different numbers 𝑁$′, 𝑁&′ , summing to 𝑁, may be found in 𝐴 
and 𝐵 respectively, so there undoubtedly are new states in ΓW that are collectively accessible; 
but they amount only to fluctuations in number density, contributing a negligible increase to 
the entropy, zero in the Sterling approximation.) 
In illustration, in Fig.2, the initial and final states of the two particles are numerically 
identical as points in ΓW; the two particles return to their initial state. Although the state of each 
particle, before and after, has changed (from (𝑝, 𝑞) to (𝑝′, 𝑞′) and from (𝑝′, 𝑞′) to (𝑝, 𝑞)), the 
instantaneous state of the two particles taken together, before and after, is the same. I say this 
as an ontological claim, not an epistemic one: the microstates are identically the same.  
Was this implication of Gibbs’ concept of generic phase, taken realistically, glimpsed by its 
critics? And if it was, was it deemed a contradiction in terms? I know of no discussion of the 
matter. It may have seemed like one (how can the state of each of two things be changed, yet 
the state of the two be the same?), yet there is no logical contradiction here. But it is much 
easier to accept the epistemic notion: that at some level of coarse-graining, the results of 
particle interchanges are the same. This may have been enough for Debye and Planck, but not 
for realists like Ehrenfest, Einstein, Lorentz, and Schrödinger.57 It would not explain the 
statistical dependencies, unless the dynamics, too, is blind to finer scales.58 
 
                           Figure 2: The final state in (a) and (b) is the same. 
 
6.2 Dirac’s Argument for Symmetrisation 
The radical alternative to all this is that an interchange of quantum particles over time is not a 
real physical process at all. It rapidly became orthodoxy, just as ‘all this’ might finally have 
emerged from the shadows. In Paul Dirac’s first foray into wave mechanics, ‘On the theory 
 
57 Rosenfeld (1959) puts Gibbs in the idealist camp as well.  
58 See Saunders (2013, 2018) for more in this vein.  
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of quantum mechanics’, submitted to the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London in 
August 1926, such transitions seemed to be denied.   
The paper, even by the standards of the young Dirac, was a tour de force. It showed that the 
invariance of the state under particle interchange could be defined in two, mutually exclusive 
ways: either by symmetrisation or antisymmetrisation of the vector-state (or wave-function). 
In the former case it is unchanged, whereas for the latter it alternates in sign, depending on 
whether the permutation involves an even or odd number of particle interchanges. Both leave 
the state unchanged (for the state is the vector-state up to phase). The former leads to Bose-
Einstein statistics (here Dirac cited Bose’s paper, and the two papers by Einstein we have 
considered), whereas the latter leads to what was soon to be called Fermi-Dirac statistics 
(here Dirac cited Pauli). It showed that particles with antisymmetrised wave-functions satisfy 
Pauli’s exclusion principle, and that the Hamiltonian, if it is to define a unitary evolution on 
the space of symmetrised states, must be a symmetric function of the particle positions and 
momenta.  
Novel though all this must have seemed at the time, we have prepared enough of the ground 
to see its classical counterparts using the generic phase. The distinction between symmetric 
and antisymmetric states is that between generic phases where particles can occupy the same 
one-particle states or points, and where they cannot – whether on taking the quotient space 
under permutations, coincidences of coordinates (in the case of Figure 1, the one-dimensional 
boundary 𝑥^ = 𝑥j) should be excised. The difference matters to the topology of the state-
space ΓW, but makes no difference to the volume measure. In quantum mechanics it is the other 
way round. All three state-spaces, the space of states of distinguishable particles, the space of 
symmetrised wave-functions, and the space of antisymmetrised wave-functions, have the 
same topology (they are all subspaces of Hilbert space, closed in the norm topology), but as 
is expected for a finite dimensional state space, each has a different ‘volume’ (dimension). 
Thus let the one-particle Hilbert space 𝒽 have dimension Z. Then the dimension of the N-
fold symmetrisation of 𝒽, for symmetric wave-functions, is  (𝑍 + 𝑁 − 1)!(𝑍 − 1)!𝑁! 	.																																																																																					 
It is our last look at the Boltzmann binomial. The dimension for antisymmetric wave-
functions is instead:  𝑍!(𝑍 − 𝑁)!𝑁!																																																																																									 
as can also be obtained by a simple adaptation of the symbol-sequence argument. The two 
agree in the classical limit 𝑍 ≫ 𝑁, and with Gibbs’ generic phase.  
But Dirac did not consider the classical limit, and he did not make the connection with Gibbs’ 
ideas. He did not so much ignore the links with classical statistical mechanics as to deny 
them: the new mechanics was to be developed on the principle that only measurable 
quantities were to have a mathematical meaning. He wrote: 
In Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics it is assumed that the elements of the matrices that 
represent the dynamical variables determine the frequencies and intensities of the 
components of radiation emitted. The theory thus enables one to calculate just those 
quantities that are of physical importance, and gives no information about quantities 
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such as orbital frequencies that one can never hope to measure experimentally. We 
should expect this very satisfactory characteristic to persist in all future developments 
of the theory. 
Frequency is determined by the energy difference of the states (‘orbits’) involved in the 
transition: thus  𝑚 → 𝑛 is represented by a matrix element, its modulus square is the 
intensity, and 𝜈 = (𝐸Ù − 𝐸w)/ℎ is the associated frequency. To enquire into the orbital 
velocities of the electrons themselves, about the nucleus, as fruitlessly pursued by Dirac prior 
to Heisenberg’s revolutionary paper of 1925, had obviously been a mistake, and he had taken 
the lesson to heart:   
Consider now a system that contains two or more similar particles, say, for 
definiteness, an atom with two electrons. Denote by (𝑚𝑛) that state of the atom in 
which one electron is in an orbit labelled 𝑚, and the other in the orbit 𝑛. The question 
arises whether the two states (𝑚𝑛) and (𝑛𝑚), which are physically indistinguishable 
as they differ only by the interchange of the two electrons, are to be counted as two 
different states or as only one state, i.e. do they give rise to two rows and columns in 
the matrices or to only one? If the first alternative is right, then the theory would 
enable one to calculate the intensities due to the two transitions (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑚Ë𝑛Ë) and (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑛Ë𝑚Ë) separately, as the amplitude corresponding to either would be given 
by a definite element in the matrix representing the total polarisation. The two 
transitions are, however, physically indistinguishable, and only the sum of the 
intensities for the two together could be determined experimentally. Hence, in order 
to keep the essential characteristic of the theory that it shall enable one to calculate 
only observable quantities, one must adopt the second alternative that (𝑚𝑛) and (𝑛𝑚) 
count as only one state.  
The transition (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑚Ë𝑛Ë) corresponds to Fig.3a, the transition (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑛Ë𝑚Ë) to 
Fig.3b, where the horizontal axis parameterises the different orbitals, or stationary states, of 
the electrons (and the vertical axis is as before the time). The two end states are the same 
‘because the two transitions are physically indistinguishable’, so we should not be able to 
calculate their separate contributions – they should not, indeed, occur as distinct elements in 
the theory at all, on Dirac’s operationalist philosophy. Even realists like Schrödinger agreed: 
twenty years later, writing on Gibbs’ paradox in his book Statistical Thermodynamics, the 
paradox is solved in quantum theory ‘because exchange of like particles is not a real event – 
if it were, we should have to take account of it statistically’ (p.61). 
Contrast the classical case, and with it Gibbs’ generic phase: classically there invariably are 
facts of the matter, as determined by the dynamics, as to whether or not the process of Fig.2a 
took place, or Fig.2b; and this is so whether or not they can be used to calculate any 
measurable quantity. The continuous motions of classical particles around each other leading 
to the interchange of their positions and momenta is a real physical process. We are back to 
particle trajectories; it is this argument of Dirac’s, just quoted, that cemented the doctrine: 
quantum indistinguishable particles cannot have trajectories.  
 
6.3 Quantum Trajectories 
Except that they can. The clinching argument for sameness of the classical and quantum 
concepts is that particle trajectories can perfectly well be defined in quantum mechanics as 
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they can classically, even for symmetrised states. That may not be possible in the processes 
considered by Dirac, but it clearly is for others, at least for non-interacting particles.  
Consider a symmetric vector state of two identical particles of the form: 														|Ψ⟩ = 1√2 (|𝜑Ù⟩⨂|𝜑w⟩ +	 |𝜑w⟩⨂|𝜑Ù⟩).																																									(49)			 
We may perfectly well interpret this in terms of the state |𝜑Ù⟩ of one quantum particle, and 
the state |𝜑w⟩ of another, without having to say which particle has which state, in exactly the 
same way as given the unordered pair {〈𝑞Ù, 𝑝Ù〉, 〈𝑞w, 𝑝w〉} ∈ ΓW we interpret 〈𝑞Ù, 𝑝Ù〉 as the 
position and momentum of one classical particle, and 〈𝑞w, 𝑝w〉 as the position of another.59 
Missing in both cases is any prior standard of which particles we are talking about, as was 
provided by factor-position in the tensor product of Hilbert spaces 𝒽 for unsymmetrised 
states, and respectively in the Cartesian product of phase spaces 𝛾 for the specific phase. If 
the unitary evolution of |Ψ⟩ does not lead to superpositions of such states – if it is of the form 𝑈Þm⨂𝑈Þm – then there is a one-particle state |𝜑Ù⟩ evolving under 𝑈Þm, and another one-particle 
state |𝜑w⟩ evolving under 𝑈Þm; and the two evolutions may be quite different, as beginning 
with quite different states.   
This recipe extends without any difficulty to 𝑁-particle symmetrised states, including states 
in which many particles are in the same state. It fails only when superpositions of 
symmetrised states are considered, that is given genuine entanglement (as opposed to the 
trivial kind involved in symmetrisation of the state). But the inability to attribute definite 
properties to quantum particles when genuinely entangled is a general feature of quantum 
mechanics, that applies as much to superpositions of product states of distinguishable 
particles as to superpositions of symmetrised states of indistinguishable particles. It is 
independent of the concept of indistinguishability. It is not indistinguishability that leads to 
the absence of trajectories, it is the unrestricted validity of the superposition principle.  
Particle interchanges, actively interpreted, can be defined in the quantum case just as in the 
classical: Fig.2a and 2b may well arise as different quantum processes, because they may 
arise under different Hamiltonians, just as in classical theory. Thus, consider the one-particle 
unitary evolution 𝑈Þm on 𝒽 with the action: 𝑈Þm: |𝜑Ù⟩ → |𝜑ÙË⟩; 	𝑈Þm: |𝜑wß → |𝜑wË⟩																																													 
corresponding to Dirac’s transition (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑚Ë𝑛Ë). For the transition (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑛Ë𝑚Ë) we 
have the unitary 𝑈Þm`  acting as 𝑈Þm` |𝜑Ù⟩ = |𝜑wË⟩; 	𝑈Þm` |𝜑wß = |𝜑ÙË⟩	.																																													 
In terms of unsymmetrised states, Fig.3a and 3b correspond to the two evolutions: 𝑈Þm⨂𝑈Þm: |𝜑Ù⟩⨂|𝜑w⟩ → |𝜑ÙË⟩⨂|𝜑wË⟩																																												 𝑈Þm` ⨂𝑈Þm` |𝜑Ù⟩⨂|𝜑w⟩ → |𝜑wà⟩⨂|𝜑Ùà⟩.																																										 
The two are quite different; it is no longer obvious that the final states can be identified. 
Nevertheless, they should be identified – not, as in the classical case, by passing from ordered 
pairs of states to unordered pairs, but by symmetrisation. This is perfectly compatible with 
 
59 For antisymmetrised states a ‘preferred basis’ is needed – preferred, that is, by decoherence theory. See 
Saunders (2013, 2016) for further discussion.     
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the difference between Fig. 3(a) and 3(b): given the initial 2-particle symmetrised state (49), 
the dynamics  𝑈Þm⨂𝑈Þm: |Ψ⟩ → |ΨË⟩																																																																											 
corresponds to Fig.3a, and  𝑈Þm` ⨂𝑈Þm` : |Ψ⟩ = |ΨËË⟩																																																																							 
to Fig.3b; these are two distinct dynamical processes, but they yield identically the same state |Ψ′⟩ = |Ψ′′⟩ , as can be seen by inspection. 
 
      Figure 3: Dirac’s two transitions (a)  (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑚Ë𝑛Ë), (b) (𝑚𝑛) → (𝑛Ë𝑚Ë) 
 
The argument for particle trajectories can even be run in an approximately classical sense: 
when the one-particle states in question |𝜑Ù⟩, |𝜑Ù⟩, are well-localised in configuration space 
and in momentum space, throughout the time in question – namely, when the states are 
Gaussians, with small spreads in momentum (this is much easier to arrange when the 
particles are relatively heavy).60  That is, quantum indistinguishable particles may well have 
approximate, quasi-classical trajectories, that can be arranged in one of two ways, differing in 
which particle ends up in which one-particle state. Dirac’s argument for identifying the joint 
final states in the two cases then fails, for now there is something in the formalism to say 
which transition took place – namely, the trajectories. Yet the two should still be identified, 
here as in the classical case.  
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